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Chinaʼs Indigenous Innovation Policies and the 
World Trade Organization 
 
By Daniel C.K. Chow* 
 
Abstract: China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a web of policies, regulations, 
and strategies that are designed to develop an indigenous capacity to create 
innovation and advanced technology as part of China’s larger strategy to ascend to 
the top ranks of the world’s industrialized nations.  As part of these policies, China 
has implemented rules related to government procurement, i.e. the purchase by 
Chinese government entities of products from private vendors.  China’s policies 
provide strong incentives for the purchase of products containing technology or 
intellectual property owned by Chinese business enterprises.  U.S. companies claim 
that these policies are discriminatory and could preclude them from selling their 
products to the Chinese government, which has an annual government procurement 
budget estimated by some to be as high as $1 trillion.  U.S. companies also claim that 
these policies are designed to force them to transfer their technology to China as a 
condition of selling products to the Chinese government.  Critics of these policies in 
the U.S. Congress and in U.S. industry groups argue that they are unfair, illegal, and 
in violation of China’s obligations under the World Trade Organization.  This article 
assesses these arguments and concludes that China is within its legal rights in 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a web of policies, 
regulations, and strategies that create incentives for Chinese enterprises to 
create advanced technologies in order to propel the People’s Republic of 
China (China) into the leading ranks of the most competitive nations in the 
world.1  One key goal of these strategies is to develop “national champions”2: 
Chinese companies that aspire to compete effectively with the largest and 
most powerful multinational companies (MNCs) in the world today.3  Since 
innovation and advanced technology are crucial requirements of 
competitiveness in the modern global economy, a key component of these 
strategies is to spur Chinese entities to develop the capacity to create 
 
1 For a detailed discussion of China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies, see U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-514, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, 
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. 
ECONOMY (USITC Pub. 4199, 2010) [hereinafter ITC Report]. 
2 See id. at 5-6.  “National champions” is a term used by the Chinese government to describe state-
owned or state-invested enterprises.  These enterprises, all controlled by the state, will be the leading 
business entities in China. 
3 See id. 
CHOW_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:24 PM 
 Indigenous Innovation Policies and the WTO 
 34:81 (2013) 
83 
 
innovative and advanced technologies.4  By “technology,” this Article refers 
to knowledge, know-how, and information, usually protected by 
intellectual property (IP) rights such as patents, trademarks, trade secrets, 
and other forms of IP.5  In China’s view, it can never ascend to the leading 
ranks of industrialized nations if it continues to be a recipient or importer of 
advanced technologies or IP created by innovator countries, such as the 
United States.6  Innovator countries are often reluctant to provide access to 
their “core” technologies but often only provide access to their secondary 
technologies in order to preserve a competitive advantage.7  China wants to 
become a leading innovator country in its own right and does not want to 
depend on access to technology from the United States, Japan, and western 
European nations, which now dominate the area of technology innovation.8 
To encourage innovation, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies 
create incentives in the form of government procurement policies that favor 
the purchase of products that embody technology created or owned by 
Chinese business entities.9  Government procurement refers to the purchase 
of goods and services by government entities from private vendors.10  
Today in most countries, government procurement accounts for 15%–20% 
of gross domestic product (GDP).11  In some countries, such as India, 
government procurement accounts for 30% of GDP.  In 2011, the United 
States government spent about $537 billion,12 or about 14% of the federal 
 
4 See id. at 5-1 (“From China’s perspective, its indigenous innovation policies are part of a 
legitimate and necessary effort to raise the level of domestic innovation to respond to pressing 
economic and development challenges.”). 
5 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 324 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS]. 
6 The leading industrialized nations of the world—the United States, some of the countries of the 
European Union, and Japan—are all innovator countries.  See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 12 (2d ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. 
7 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at 325. 
8 Id. at 328. 
9 China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a web of policies that deal with many different aspects 
of China’s economy.  This Article focuses on the use of government procurement policies as an 
incentive to spur local innovation, but there are many other aspects of China’s Indigenous Innovation 
Policies that involve technical standards, competition policy under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 
taxation policy, and intellectual property rights and enforcement.  See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-1. 
10 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, 
CASES, AND MATERIALS 173 (Aspen 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].  
11 Id.  
12 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-919, IMPROVED AND EXPANDED USE 
COULD SAVE BILLIONS IN ANNUAL PROCUREMENT COSTS (2012).  The size of government 
procurement in China depends on what types of entities (central, sub-central, and state owned 
enterprises) are included.  State owned enterprises, or companies that are administrative units of the 
state, continue to dominate China’s economy.  If spending by state-owned enterprises is included, 
spending figures increase significantly. 
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budget,13 on the purchase of goods and services from private sector 
vendors.  The United States estimates that China now spends between $88–
$200 billion per year on government procurement,14 while the European 
Union estimates that China spends up to $1 trillion in annual government 
procurement.15  The growth in government procurement provides private 
vendors with eager government buyers with enormous resources and the 
ability to pay in cash for a fleet of jet passenger airplanes or immense 
infrastructure projects, such as the building of airports and bridges.  Since 
China states that its procurement budget grew ten-fold between 2002 and 
2012, China’s government procurement is likely to become even more 
important going forward as a source of revenue for private businesses.16  
Not surprisingly, many U.S. companies are eager to sell products and 
services to the Chinese government.17  If Chinese government entities are 
required to purchase products that embody technology created or owned by 
Chinese entities, however, U.S. companies may find few opportunities to 
sell products to Chinese government entities. 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies have triggered a storm of 
controversy and protest in the United States.18  Many U.S. companies argue 
that these policies have now surpassed counterfeiting and commercial 
piracy as the most important IP issue between the United States and 
China.19  U.S. companies claim that these policies blatantly discriminate 
against U.S. goods in China’s government procurement and do not fairly 
reciprocate the trading relationship between the United States and China.20  
Currently U.S. state and local governments purchase billions of dollars in 
 
13 See Jeanne Sahadi, Cutting Washington Could Hit Main Street, CNN MONEY (July 23, 2012), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/news/economy/federal-spending/index.htm. 
14 See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-9 (reporting $88 billion figure); WAYNE M. MORRISON, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, CHINA–U.S. TRADE ISSUES 43 (July 17, 2013) (testimony of Karen 
Laney, acting director of operations of the International Trade Commission, reporting the $200 billion 
figure).   
15 China Unlikely to Join WTO Agreement, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/21/c_131489311.htm. 
16 When China’s entry into the WTO was being negotiated, China’s government procurement 
budget was only a fraction of what it is today.  In 2002, China’s government procurement budget was 
only $16 billion, but it grew ten-fold over the last decade.  See Lan Lan, Government Procurement 
Expanded 10-Fold, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:24 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-
07/03/content_15546264.htm (Deputy Finance Minister Wang Boan stating that China’s government 
procurement budget expanded from $16 billion in 2002 to $178 billion in 2012).  
17 Jose W. Fernandez, Fostering a Rules-Based System in the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/197015.htm. 
18 See Levin Warns of Potential Hill Action on China, CONGRESSDAILY, July 16, 2010, at 10-10.  
19 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-519, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (USITC 
Pub. 4199, 2011). 
20 China’s Indigenous Innovation Trade and Investment Politic: How Great a Threat?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
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goods and services from Chinese companies, but China’s government 
procurement policies effectively close off the Chinese government 
procurement market to U.S. private businesses.21  According to U.S. 
companies, most U.S. products will not qualify for purchase by the Chinese 
government under the criteria set forth by these policies.  In addition, U.S. 
companies claim that these policies are designed to force them to transfer 
their advanced technologies to Chinese entities as a condition of being able 
to sell goods and services to the Chinese government.22  If they do not 
transfer their technologies to Chinese entities, these U.S. companies will be 
shut out from the highly lucrative Chinese government procurement 
market.23  Furthermore, if U.S. companies do transfer their technologies to 
Chinese entities, then the technologies will be stolen or pirated.  
Consequently, U.S. companies argue that China intends for these policies 
to help it steal U.S. intellectual property rights.24  A later part of this Article 
explains, in detail, why U.S. companies believe that they are being coerced 
into transferring their technologies to Chinese entities where the technology 
will be stolen.25 
Spurred on by the concerns of U.S. businesses, the United States 
government has put pressure on Chinese authorities to change these 
policies.26  Some critics argue that China’s policies violate its WTO 
obligations with the United States.27  The United States is a member of the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA),28 which prohibits the 
United States from discriminating against goods and services from other 
GPA members in favor of U.S. goods and services in government 
 
21 See David Barboza, Bridge Comes to San Francisco with a Made in China Label, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2011, at A1 (describing $7.2 billion spent by California in government procurement of Chinese 
services to build a bridge in San Francisco, and purchases by New York of a wide array of Chinese 
services and goods related to infrastructure projects). 
22 See MORRISON, supra note 14, at 30 (quoting a U.S. WTO representative as stating that China’s 
policies were aimed at “coercing technology transfer” and that “Chinese regulations . . . frequently 
called for technology transfer, and in certain cases, conditioned, or proposed to condition, the eligibility 
for government benefits or preferences on intellectual property being owned or developed in China, or 
being licensed, in some cases exclusively, to a Chinese party”). 
23 See id. at 29–30 (noting concerns of U.S. Chamber of Commerce that China’s Indigenous 
Innovation Policies would “make it virtually impossible for any non-Chinese companies to participate 
in China’s government procurement” without transferring their technology to China). 
24 See Geithner Slams China’s Intellectual Property Policies, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/23/us-china-geithner-idUSTRE78M15G20110923 (quoting a 
statement by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a 
continuation of its “decades old strategy to steal American intellectual property rights”). 
25 See infra Part II.A. 
26 See U.S. to Raise IPR Issues with China, CHINA DAILY (May 22, 2010), http://www.china.org.cn/ 
business/2010-05/22/content_20096107.htm. 
27 See infra Part III.B. 
28 WTO Government Procurement Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/government-procurement/wto-government-procurement-agreement 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2013). 
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procurement.29  Under the GPA and federal laws, the United States is 
prohibited from using federal funds to purchase goods and services from 
non-GPA members.  Unlike the federal government, however, state 
governments can and do purchase goods and services from China.30  China 
is currently not a member of the GPA, however, so it can effectively 
require Chinese government entities to purchase goods and services from 
Chinese vendors instead of U.S. vendors.  Since the GPA is a “plurilateral” 
agreement under the WTO,31 WTO members decide whether to join the 
GPA on a voluntary basis.  By contrast, other WTO agreements, such as 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) are mandatory treaties that are 
automatically binding on all nations that accede to the WTO.  Since China 
is within its rights in not acceding to the GPA, China is under no obligation 
to provide reciprocal non-discriminatory treatment to foreign goods in 
government procurement and is free to discriminate in favor of Chinese 
goods.  As a result, China is permitted under the WTO to discriminate in 
favor of Chinese goods and against foreign firms in awarding government 
procurement contracts.32  Some critics, however, reject China’s position 
and argue that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies violate China’s 
obligations under the WTO.33  A later part of this Article surveys these 
arguments and concludes that they are either invalid or ineffective. 
This Article examines the controversy between the United States and 
China in detail.  Part II reviews China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and 
the concerns of U.S. companies.  This part explains the crux of U.S. 
companies’ complaints that these policies are unfair because they “force” 
them to transfer technology to China and help Chinese companies steal 
their intellectual property.  Part III then analyzes whether China’s 
Indigenous Innovation Policies are in violation of the WTO agreements.  
This part examines whether China is allowed to discriminate in government 
procurement under the WTO agreements,34 as well as under China’s 
Protocol of Accession to the WTO,35 i.e., the legal instrument setting forth 
 
29 See Overview of the Government Procurement Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_overview_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
30 See Barboza, supra note 21. 
31 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173. 
32 See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-8–5-9; INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, WRITTEN COMMENTS TO 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE IN RESPONSE TO FEDERAL 
REGISTER NOTICE REGARDING CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH ITS ACCESSION COMMITMENTS TO THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 5 (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www.tiaonline.org/sites/ 
default/files/pages/PUSITOChinaWTOComplianceFiling.pdf. 
33 See infra Part III.B. 
34 Official versions of all WTO agreements are available on the WTO website.  See Documents and 
Resources, WORLD TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/english/res_e/res_e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2013). 
35 See World Trade Org., Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Ministerial 
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the conditions of China’s admission to the WTO.  This part also examines 
other arguments by critics that China has violated other WTO obligations.  
Part III reaches several tentative conclusions.  First, China is within its 
legal rights to discriminate in favor of Chinese goods and services because 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies do not violate any significant WTO 
obligations.  Second, although some aspects of China’s Indigenous 
Innovation Policies may violate certain peripheral WTO obligations, the 
remedy for these violations under the WTO is to bring the offending 
measures into compliance with the WTO Agreements.36  Bringing 
violations into WTO compliance, however, does not address the key 
underlying problem confronting the United States government and U.S. 
companies.  The ultimate goal of the United States is to induce China to 
join the GPA, which after all is a voluntary decision on the part of China, 
given that no WTO member is required to join the GPA.37  No litigation in 
the WTO or pressure from the United States will induce China to join the 
GPA on terms acceptable to the United States.38  Rather, threatening China 
with litigation in the WTO over its Indigenous Innovation Policies could 
have the opposite effect of hardening China’s stance and delaying China’s 
accession to the GPA.  What may be necessary in the long term are trade 
concessions from the United States that will serve as an inducement for 
China to join the GPA.39 
 
Decision of 10 November 2001, WT/L/432 (2002) [hereinafter China’s Protocol of Accession], available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf. 
36 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 67.  The ultimate 
goal of the WTO is to induce an offending member to bring a non-complying measure into conformity 
with the WTO agreements.  Although the aggrieved member may be authorized in some cases to 
impose retaliatory trade measures on the offending member, these measures are always viewed as 
temporary.  The long-term goal is to induce compliance with WTO obligations, which will reduce or 
eliminate trade distortions caused by the offending measure and produce the greatest benefit to the 
WTO system.  See id. 
37 See id. at 173. 
38 Joining the GPA is completely up to each WTO member.  There is no legal basis within the 
WTO to legally coerce a member to join the GPA, so any litigation by the United States in the WTO 
would be part of a campaign to pressure China to join the GPA against its will.  China has recently 
demonstrated that it has no tolerance for being bullied by the United States or any other country.  See 
China Defends Expanded Military After Memories of Bullying, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-04/china-defends-expanded-military-after-memories-of-
bullying-1-.html (discussing lessons learned after being bullied).  Both the United States and the 
European Union have objected to China’s past offers to join the GPA because China is making 
commitments that obligate only a few government entities to purchase foreign goods and services and 
involve only a small volume of trade.  See Europe Says China’s Latest Bid to Join Procurement 
Agreement “Highly Disappointing,” REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/12/06/us-china-eu-trade-idUSBRE8B50G720121206.  If the United States, the EU, and 
other GPA members were to accept China’s offer, China would get the full benefit of the more 
expansive commitments of the United States and the EU in exchange for a narrow commitment on the 
part of China.  This type of tactic leads many critics to argue that China tries to exploit the WTO 
system. 
39 A trade concession is a trade benefit given to China by the United States as part of a deal that 
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II.  A CLOSER LOOK AT CHINA’S INDIGENOUS INNOVATION 
POLICIES 
 
Under China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies, PRC government 
entities are encouraged to buy products that have been officially accredited 
by PRC authorities.40  Only enterprises having Chinese legal person status41 
can apply for accreditation for a product.42  To be accredited, a product 
must have been manufactured by an entity that has full ownership of 
intellectual property rights in China, either by creating the rights or by 
acquiring them.43  For example, in the case of a product protected by 
patents, the Chinese entity must be the registered patent owner in China.44 
If the product also has a trademark, a Chinese entity must be the 
registered trademark owner in China before the product can be accredited 
for procurement by Chinese government entities.45  An additional set of 
measures creates incentives and priorities for the purchase of accredited 
products by PRC government authorities.46  The combination of these 
 
China will join the GPA.  For example, the United States federal government might offer to purchase a 
large quantity of Chinese made goods and services, conditioned upon China’s accession to the GPA.  In 
addition to providing financial benefits, a trade concession would be politically more acceptable to 
China’s leaders because it would be perceived as a carrot and not as a stick.  Bowing to pressure—a 
stick—might revive painful memories of China’s long period of domination by foreign powers.  See 
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 8–9 
(West, 2d ed. 2009). 
40 See Guojia Zizhu Chuangxin Changpin Rending Guanli Banfa (Shixing) (国家自主创新产品认
定管理办法(试行) [Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National Indigenous 
Innovation Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of Sci. & Tech., the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n 
& the Ministry of Fin., Dec. 28, 2006, effective Dec. 28, 2006), ¶ 2 [hereinafter Trial Measures]. 
41 A Chinese legal person is an enterprise or business entity formed under Chinese law.  See Ming 
Fa Tongze (民法通则) [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/ 
public/detail.php?id=2696.  Foreign entities can establish a Chinese business entity known as a Foreign-
Invested Enterprise under PRC law.  See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN 
CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 85 (West 2012) [hereinafter CHOW & HAN, DOING 
BUSINESS IN CHINA]. 
42 See Trial Measures, supra note 40, ¶ 3. 
43 Id. ¶ 4. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 For example, government entities are required to give priorities in their budgets for the purchase 
of accredited products.  See Zizhu Chuangxin Changpin Zhengfu Caigou Yusuan Guanli Banfa (自主创
新产品政府采购预算管理办法) [Administrative Measures on Government Procurement Budget for 
Indigenous Innovation Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., effective Apr. 3, 2007) (China).  
Accredited products enjoy financial incentives such as price reductions and extra weight in product 
evaluations.  Zizhu Chuangxin Chanpin Zhengfu Caigou Pingshen Banfa (自主创新产品政府采购评
审办法) [Evaluation Measures on Indigenous Innovation Products for Government Procurement] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., effective Apr. 3, 2007) (China).  The Ministry of Finance 
officially revoked these measures in June 2011, but the American Chamber of Commerce believes that 
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measures means that few opportunities may exist for non-accredited 
products in PRC government procurement. 
As noted earlier, the goal of these policies is to encourage domestic 
innovation, and to build and support “national champions.”47  By providing 
financial incentives that favor domestic innovation, the Chinese 
government hopes to nurture research and develop indigenous capabilities 
to create advanced technologies rather than relying upon access to 
technologies from foreign suppliers, which has been the case for China 
during the past three decades since the beginning of its economic reforms.48  
China believes that relying on technologies created by foreign countries 
places China at a significant competitive disadvantage.49  In a typical 
technology transfer transaction that occurs between parties from the United 
States and China, the United States IP owner will register patents, 
trademarks, or copyrights with the appropriate PRC authorities.50  The U.S. 
party is the legal owner of the IP rights in China and then licenses the use 
of the rights to a Chinese entity in a technology transfer agreement.51  The 
Chinese licensee is permitted to use the technology but remains a licensee, 
not an owner.52  The disadvantages of this approach are two-fold.  First, the 
U.S. licensor will typically charge licensing fees or royalties, which may be 
onerous.  Second, the U.S. licensor may be unwilling to license its most 
advanced, cutting-edge technologies, but will only license secondary or 
outdated technologies to the Chinese licensee.53  U.S. IP owners have held 
longstanding concerns that any technology that is transferred may be 
misappropriated or stolen.54  An additional concern is that when contract 
disputes arise between the parties, the technology licensing agreements 
may be difficult to enforce in Chinese courts.55  Another concern is that 
 
challenges persist as local provinces have not stopped applying the national regulations or their own 
local legislation.  See AMCHAM CHINA, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA: 2013 WHITE PAPER 42 (2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.amchamchina.org/article/11206.  For 
instance, on November 11, 2011, Guangdong Province issued a local regulation providing preferences 
to indigenous innovation.  Id.  In addition, the central level Ministry of Industry and Information issued 
its 2012 Catalogue for Indigenous Innovation of Major Technical Equipment on January 12, 2012 to 
replace the 2009 version, which gave clear preferences to indigenous innovation.  The 2012 catalogue 
does not provide clear guidelines on whether indigenous innovation will still be given preferences 
leaving U.S. businesses with uncertainty on whether other Chinese central level authorities will respect 
the 2011 revocation by the Ministry of Finance of the measures creating preferences for indigenous 
innovation.  Id. at 44. 
47 ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
48 See id. at 5-2–5-3. 
49 See Siyuan An & Brian Peck, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy in the Context of its WTO 
Obligations and Commitments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375, 385 (2011). 
50 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at 328. 
54 Id. at 328. 
55 Effective enforcement of court judgments in China remains a serious issue.  Many barriers, such 
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when the licensing agreement is terminated, the licensee may continue to 
use the technology, now in its possession, without permission.56  For all of 
these reasons, U.S. IP owners are concerned about the risks involved in 
technology transfer contracts.  One method of mitigating these risks is to 
demand high royalty payments.  A second method is to license only non-
essential and secondary technologies while keeping advanced core 
technologies in-house. 
China has recognized that its dependence on foreign innovation places 
it at a competitive disadvantage and to some extent at the mercy of foreign 
IP owners.57  China is also keenly aware that it cannot assume a role as a 
leading economic power unless it becomes an innovator nation.  Nations 
that are innovators not only create competitive products but also set 
industry standards that other competitors will need to follow.58  In the 
modern global economy, nations can be divided into two categories: (1) 
innovators and exporters of technology and (2) recipients and importers of 
technology.59  No country that falls in the latter category can be considered 
to be a leading economic power.60  It is no coincidence that the United 
States, Japan, and certain members of the EU lead the list of innovator 
countries;61 China’s long-term goal is to be among them.  To achieve that 
goal, China needs to wean itself off its dependence on acquiring technology 
from foreign nations, with all of its shortcomings, and to develop its own 
capacity to innovate and create advanced technology.  China’s Indigenous 
Innovation Policies are a key component of its strategy to reach this goal.62 
 
 
as a lack of resources and local protectionism, prevent the enforcement of the majority of court 
judgments.  See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 40, at 531–32. 
56 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 5, at 325.  
57 See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 385.   
58 Setting global standards is another part of China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies.  See ITC 
Report, supra note 1, at 5-12–5-20.  China is determined to use its own national standards and to 
promulgate them on a global level.  The promulgation of Chinese standards will give technology that is 
of Chinese origin a competitive advantage in the world marketplace as other countries will need to 
adopt China’s standards and, in the process, use China’s technology.  This implicates a second issue 
under the WTO: China’s use of its own national technical standards when international standards are 
already available and should be used instead.  The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement) requires the use of international standards over national standards whenever 
international standards are available, so China’s policies may be in tension with the TBT.  See CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 276. 
59 See CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 12. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-2–5-3 (“[I]ndigenous innovation policies encompass several 
of the Chinese government’s long-term policy goals, including promoting domestic companies’ 
contributions to the Chinese economy rather than relying on foreign know-how and technology, 
building domestic R&D capabilities to upgrade Chinese firms’ innovative capacity, and generally 
increasing the share of added value that Chinese companies contribute to China’s economy.”). 
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A.  Concerns of U.S. Multinational Companies 
 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies have caused great 
consternation and concern among U.S. companies that wish to sell products 
and services to the Chinese government.63  U.S. companies argue that these 
policies are discriminatory and are designed to force them to transfer their 
technology to China.64  What exactly are these arguments? 
Let us suppose that Company A, a U.S.-based company, wishes to sell 
products to the PRC government.  Company A has patents for the products 
registered in the United States, as well as patents for the products registered 
in China.65  In order to sell products to the Chinese government, these 
products must be accredited for government procurement by the 
appropriate Chinese authorities.  Company A is concerned with a measure 
that only Chinese legal enterprises can apply for accreditation of their 
products, and the Chinese enterprise must be the full owner of any 
intellectual property rights embedded in the products or the service.66  In 
this case, although Company A owns the Chinese patent, Company A is not 
a Chinese legal enterprise, but is a U.S. company.  Company A is not 
entitled to apply for accreditation for its products and, as a result, the 
Chinese government will not purchase Company A’s products.  If 
Company B, a Chinese enterprise, sells competing products that are 
accredited, then the Chinese government will purchase the products from 
B, even if the products contain a lower level of technology or are inferior in 
some other respect to A’s products.  U.S. companies argue that these 
 
63 See Vicki Needham, Chinese Policies Hurting U.S. Businesses, THE HILL (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/157811-chinese-business-policies-hurting-us-
businesses (expressing concern of American Chamber of Commerce (representing U.S. businesses) that 
China’s policies related to indigenous innovation and government procurement favor local companies 
over foreign competition). 
64 See Michele Nash-Hoff, Chinese Innovation Mercantilism is Hurting American Manufacturers, 
CAN AM. MFG. BE SAVED? (Dec. 12, 2012), http://savingusmanufacturing.com/blog/outsourcing/ 
chinese-innovation-mercantilism-is-hurting-american-manufacturers/ (claiming that Chinese policies 
are designed to force technology transfer to China).  For a particularly aggressive criticism of how 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are hurting U.S. companies, see ROBERT D. ATKINSON, ITIF, 
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: CONFRONTING CHINESE INNOVATION MERCANTILISM (Feb. 2012), 
http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf.  The U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury has publicly stated that China has been “very, very aggressive” in stealing U.S. intellectual 
property and that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies are a continuation of this strategy.  See 
Timothy Geithner, China Very, Very Aggressive in Stealing U.S. Technology, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/23/timothy-geithner-china-very-aggressive-stealing-
technology_n_977509.html (last updated Nov. 23, 2011). 
65 Under the principle of territoriality, each patent is independent and is a creature of the legal 
system in which the rights are created and provides protection only within the borders of the nation 
grating the patent in the absence of an international agreement providing for cross border recognition.  
Thus, in the example above, Company A has two patents: a U.S. patent and a Chinese patent for the 
same invention.  See CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 16–17. 
66 See Trial Measures, supra note 40, ¶¶ 3–4.  
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policies discriminate against U.S. products and services in Chinese 
government procurement.67 
Given China’s current policies, how would it be possible for a U.S. 
company to sell products with U.S. created technology to the Chinese 
government?  One obvious approach would be for a U.S. company to 
assign or sell ownership of its intellectual property rights to an unaffiliated 
Chinese legal enterprise.68  An assignment is a transfer of complete 
ownership of the intellectual property, so the Chinese purchaser now 
becomes the owner of the technology and can obtain accreditation for the 
products made using the technology.  Company A has been able to earn a 
profit by selling its technology to a Chinese purchaser, so in this sense 
Company A has been able to benefit indirectly from China’s government 
procurement.  However, since the advanced technology itself is the most 
valuable business asset in this transaction,69 not the products that embody 
the technology,70 most MNCs would find such an approach to be 
completely unacceptable. 
An alternative, less-drastic method that will allow the U.S. IP owner 
to retain some control over the technology involves a series of complicated 
steps beginning with establishing a business entity in China, which the U.S. 
company will own in whole or in part.  The Chinese business entity will 
then serve as the recipient of the technology.  This process necessarily 
involves the transfer of technology to the Chinese business entity.  This 
required step is what U.S. companies are referring to when they claim that 
China’s policies are “forcing” them to transfer their IP to China.71  A 
 
67 This scenario has played out in a number of industries, affecting U.S. wind energy companies, 
telecommunications manufacturers, software companies, and the automotive industry.  For example, 
“[f]oreign firms have limited access to the government procurement market, which accounts for all of 
the largest wind farm projects in China.  This situation sharply limits the prospects for U.S.-based wind 
energy companies in China.  Chinese joint-venture companies that are majority foreign-owned 
reportedly are not considered to be domestic companies in the concession process, largely excluding 
foreign firms that have invested in local production in China.”  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: 
EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE 
U.S. ECONOMY 5–19 (2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf. 
68 The proper procedure is for A to assign its Chinese patent to a Chinese legal enterprise, which 
becomes the new owner.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 
supra note 5, at 328–29. 
69 For a discussion of the importance of technology in modern international business, see id. at 
324–25. 
70 For example, assume that a high quality detergent contains an enzyme formula that is protected 
by a patent in China.  For the purposes of this Article, the technology involved is the enzyme formula, 
not the detergent.  The enzyme formula is the core business asset, not the boxes of detergent that are 
sold to the Chinese buyer.  Assigning the patent to a Chinese business entity would grant the assignee 
the know-how to make the formula to use it in all detergent in the future.  
71 The argument that China is “forcing” U.S. companies to transfer their technology is often made 
in the popular press.  See, e.g., Robert Oak, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy Bigger Threat to U.S. 
Economy Than Offshore Outsourcing, ECONOMIC POPULIST (June 18, 2012), 
http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/chinas-indigenous-innovation-policy-bigger-threat-us-
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detailed discussion of these steps follows below. 
The MNC will first have to set up a Foreign-Invested Enterprise (FIE) 
in China.  By law, an FIE is a Chinese legal entity that is a special vehicle 
designed for foreign direct investment, i.e., a recipient of foreign capital 
and technology.72  The FIE is set up and owned by a foreign entity, i.e., an 
entity that is a national of a country other than China.73  All FIEs must be 
specifically approved by the Chinese government and operate under a legal 
regime specifically designed for FIEs.74  An FIE could be a joint venture, 
i.e., a business entity that is jointly owned by the U.S. company and a local 
Chinese partner, or it can be a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE), 
which is essentially a wholly-owned subsidiary of the MNC.75  Although an 
FIE is partly or wholly owned by the U.S. multinational company, the FIE 
is a business entity formed under Chinese law, so it is a Chinese legal 
person.  The next step is for the U.S. MNC to have the Chinese legal 
enterprise register the U.S. company’s intellectual property rights in the 
name of the Chinese business entity.  For example, if Company A has a 
U.S. patent for an invention, then Company A will authorize its FIE to 
register the same patent in China using the FIE’s own name.  The 
registration of the patent in China under the name of the FIE means that the 
FIE now becomes the official and legal owner of the patent in China.76  
Finally, the FIE manufactures the product using the patent or other 
intellectual property registered in the FIE’s own name.  At this point, the 
FIE, a Chinese legal person that owns the IP rights, can now apply for 
accreditation for its property because the FIE has fulfilled all of the 
requirements for accreditation under China’s Indigenous Innovation 
Policies.  This process is what U.S. companies describe as “forcing” them 
to transfer their technologies to China in order to bid on PRC government 
 
economy-offshore-outsourcing (“China’s indigenous innovation policy means corporations are forced 
to technology transfer to China their intellectual know-how, advanced technologies in order to even do 
business in China and certain to obtain Chinese government contracts.”).  These arguments do not set 
out in detail the discussion in the text on the use of Chinese business entities by which this technology 
transfer is accomplished.  The discussion below sets forth a step-by-step procedure for technology 
transfer that will allow a U.S. corporation to qualify for accreditation in order to sell to the Chinese 
government.  
72 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 85. 
73 See id.  
74 See id.  
75 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, Chapter 2. 
76 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 
2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 8, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id= 
178664 (“After the application is granted, the applying unit(s) or individual(s) shall be deemed the 
patentee(s).”).  The PRC Patent Law distinguishes only between foreigners, foreign enterprise, and 
foreign organizations without a regular residence or business site in China on one hand and Chinese 
companies and individuals on the other.  Id. arts. 18–19.  FIEs are Chinese companies so they can apply 
for patent rights.  See GRAHAM BROWN, CHINA COMPANY LAW GUIDE 29–110 (2005). 
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B.  Risks to U.S. Companies in Complying with China’s 
Accreditation Policies 
 
From the perspective of U.S. MNCs, going through all of the steps set 
forth above in order to meet the conditions to obtain accreditation and to 
have its products qualify for government procurement in China is both 
burdensome and full of risk.78  Setting up an FIE in China is a time 
consuming process.  For example, setting up a joint venture can easily take 
18 months from the start of negotiations to the final approval of the joint 
venture by the appropriate authorities.79  Unlike the simple procedure for 
establishing a corporation in most states in the United States, the approval 
of an FIE involves numerous meetings with PRC authorities, who will 
make specific and detailed demands.  A major concern of the PRC approval 
authorities is that the FIE must have sufficient capital in order to operate as 
a going concern.  For this reason, PRC authorities will often insist on 
injections of capital in the millions or tens of millions of dollars as a 
condition of approval.80 
A second, and perhaps even greater concern, is risk created by the 
transfer of technology to the FIE.  Once the IP is registered in its name, the 
FIE is the legal owner of the technology in China, not the MNC.81  In cases 
where the FIE is a joint venture, the local Chinese partner becomes a partial 
owner of the IP in proportion to the equity ownership of the local partner in 
the joint venture.82  Even where the MNC is the sole owner of the FIE as in 
the case of a WFOE, the FIE is a separate legal person.  The FIE is a 
 
77 This is the author’s own elaboration and explanation of arguments by U.S. companies.  
78 Setting up an FIE consumes a great deal of senior management time and involves many layers of 
government approval.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra 
note 5, at 489–94.  
79 See id. at 493. 
80 This observation is based on the author’s own working experience as in-house counsel for a 
multinational company in China.  The author attended a number of meetings with PRC approval 
authorities in which PRC officials made specific requests concerning capital requirements in connection 
with several joint ventures that the multinational company was in the process of establishing.  PRC 
officials want to ensure that the new business entity will be successful and so will insist on an injection 
of sufficient capital to allow the entity to meet all of its operational needs.  If anything, PRC officials err 
on the side of requiring more capital, rather than less.  From the author’s own experience there are 
numerous joint ventures in China with capital requirements of tens of millions of dollars.  
81 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321. 
82 See id.  If the local joint venture partner owns 40% of the equity of the joint venture, the joint 
venture partner owns 40% of the joint venture’s assets, including the intellectual property rights.  See 
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国中外合资经营企
业法) [Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2001, effective Mar. 15, 2001), art 4, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/DAT/214773.htm. 
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Chinese legal entity with its own management.  While the management of a 
wholly-owned entity will usually follow instructions from the parent 
company, there can be cases where disagreement and conflict arise between 
parent and subsidiary.83  The FIE, even where it is a WFOE, can legally 
transfer the IP rights without the consent of the parent since the FIE is the 
legal owner of the IP rights in China and the parent has no ability to stop 
such a transfer because it has relinquished ownership rights to the FIE.84  
The FIE might lose the IP rights for other reasons, such as insolvency, debt, 
or a hostile merger and acquisition.85  The risk is that as soon as the IP is in 
the name of the FIE, not in the name of the U.S. company, the IP can be 
transferred, assigned, or lost without any control by the U.S. company.86  
This type of risk is why all MNCs that do business in China (or in any 
other country) will insist on registering the IP in their own names in the 
foreign country so that they remain the legal owners and can then license 
the IP to their own subsidiaries or joint ventures.87 
A third and related risk is misappropriation or theft.  If the U.S. 
company must transfer its IP rights to a Chinese legal entity, then the IP 
rights might become exposed to misappropriation, theft, or counterfeiting.88  
Theft of IP rights is always a risk in China but under PRC law, generally 
only the registered owner of the IP right can bring an enforcement action.89  
Since the FIE is technically the legal owner, not the U.S. company, only the 
FIE can bring an enforcement action, such as a lawsuit or an administrative 
action.90  Again, even where the FIE is a wholly-owned entity of the MNC, 
 
83 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321. 
84 See id.  As the registered owner of the patent, the FIE has authority to assign the patent to a new 
owner.  If the U.S. parent company has an agreement with the FIE that the FIE will not assign the 
patent, the agreement creates a contract right, not an intellectual property right.  If the FIE assigns the 
patent in disregard of the agreement, the U.S. parent may have a breach of contract claim against the 
FIE, but the assignment is still legally valid, and the U.S. parent still lacks the direct right to enforce the 
patent. 
85 See CHOW & HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, supra note 41, at 321.  
86 Id. 
87 Id.  If the U.S. company is the licensor of the IP rights and the foreign subsidiary is the licensee, 
the subsidiary has no authority to transfer any intellectual property rights.  The license can provide that 
in the event of such intervening events, such as insolvency, the license will terminate, leaving the parent 
company as the owner of the IP rights.  Id. at 320–22. 
88 Counterfeiting and commercial piracy are considered to be serious business problems in China.  
Id. at 375. 
89 For example, only the registered trademark owner can bring a trademark enforcement action. 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (华人民共和国商标法) [Patent Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, 
effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 53, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=131395. 
90 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 76, art. 60 (“If a dispute arises as a 
result of exploitation of a patent without permission of the patentee, that is, the patent right of the 
patentee is infringed, the dispute shall be settled through consultation between the parties.  If the parties 
are not willing to consult or if consultation fails, the patentee or interested party may take legal action 
before a people’s court, and may also request the administration department for patent-related work to 
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the MNC is unable to take any action on its own to protect the IP rights, 
and it must rely on the FIE.91  Thus, once the IP rights are registered in the 
name of the FIE, the U.S. company has lost the ability to exercise direct 
control over how the rights are to be protected.92  The exposure of IP rights 
to misappropriation and theft once the rights are transferred to the FIE is 
what U.S. companies mean when they claim that China’s Indigenous 
Innovation Policies are designed to allow China to “steal” their IP rights.93 
An additional risk is that once Chinese entities obtain technology 
transferred from U.S. IP owners, these entities will use the technology to 
compete with the U.S. IP owners in China and in other countries.94  China 
will use the advanced technology to improve its own international 
competitiveness and may eventually leapfrog the innovator of the 
technology.95  In other words, U.S. companies fear that they are giving 
China the very tools to overtake them in the global economy, a concern that 
many observers believe has already been realized in practice.96 
MNCs view the many risks attendant in meeting the requirements set 
forth under China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies to qualify for 
accreditation as serious barriers.97  Few U.S. companies are likely willing 
to undertake the time, to expend the resources, and to incur the risks 
involved in undergoing the process described above to qualify for 
 
handle the dispute.”). 
91 The U.S. company might enter into an agreement under which the FIE will enforce all IP rights 
on behalf of the parent, but if the FIE refuses to enforce the rights for any reason, the U.S. company will 
have only a breach of contract action against the FIE.  Since the IP rights are in the name of the FIE as 
the owner, the U.S. company has no legal interest in the rights and would still be unable to directly 
enforce the IP rights.  See id.  This is the basic shortcoming of relying on an FIE to enforce the IP rights 
of a U.S. parent company. 
92 The U.S. company is faced with a dilemma here.  If the U.S. company wants to be able to 
directly enforce its IP rights, it must register the IP right in its own name.  However, registering the IP 
right in its own name will disqualify the U.S. company from receiving accreditation for government 
procurement.  In order to receive accreditation, the U.S. company must allow the FIE, a Chinese legal 
entity, to register the IP right.  This forces the U.S. company to lose direct control over how the IP 
rights are enforced. 
93 See Geithner, supra note 64 (quoting U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner as saying: “We’re seeing 
China continue to be very, very aggressive in a strategy they started several decades ago, which goes 
like this: you want to sell to our country, we want you to come produce here . . . if you want to come 
produce here, you need to transfer your technology to us.”).  
94 See ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-1 (“[F]oreign businesses have reportedly been pressured to 
transfer know-how and technology to Chinese firms in order to gain access to the Chinese market.  
Businesses are concerned that this IP ultimately will be used by Chinese companies competing against 
them in China and in third-country markets.”).  
95 This concern is a valid one but it may be too late to prevent the consequences discussed above.  
In fact, China has used technology obtained from foreign technology transfers to transform itself from 
an agrarian-based economy into an industrial power in the span of just a few decades.  See CHOW & 
LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 15. 
96 See id. 
97 See supra Part II.B. 
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accreditation.98  As a result, U.S. companies risk being shut out of the 
lucrative government procurement in China while Chinese companies have 
the option of selling to U.S. states in local government procurement.99  
Many U.S. companies believe that this situation is unfair and some argue 
that it is illegal under the WTO.100 
 
III.  ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WTO 
 
Rather than undertaking the risks of qualifying their products for 
government procurement as discussed above, U.S. companies have chosen 
to pressure China to change its Indigenous Innovation Policies.101  Several 
of these critics contend that China has failed to fulfill its WTO obligations 
contained in the WTO Agreements and in China’s Protocol of 
Accession.102  Critics argue that the United States government should file a 
case against China in the WTO dispute settlement system unless China 
withdraws or modifies its government procurement policies to allow equal 
access by U.S. companies.103  This part of the Article examines the merits 
of these arguments and this strategy in detail, and shows that the Chinese 




98 “[A]s of September 2010, a number of provincial indigenous innovation catalogues are in 
effect . . . . There are almost no products made by foreign companies in these catalogues, a pattern that 
seemingly excludes foreign companies from provincial government procurement markets unless there is 
no Chinese-made alternative to a foreign product . . . . For example, only two of the 523 products in 
Shanghai’s catalogue were made by FIEs, both of which have majority Chinese ownership; Jiangxi’s 
475-product catalogue includes only one from an FIE; and Beijing’s government procurement 
catalogues include only one foreign product out of 56 listed.”  ITC Report, supra note 1, at 5-12. 
99 See Barboza, supra note 21, at A-1, A-4 (describing the California and New York state purchase 
of massive infrastructure projects from China).  
100 See infra Part III. 
101 See Paul Eckert, Lawmakers Urge Firm Line on China in Bilateral Talks, REUTERS, July 9, 
2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-usa-china-congress-idUSBRE9681AM 
20130709 (“Among the Chinese practices the lawmakers said required more U.S. pressure to change 
were ‘indigenous innovation’ policies that require foreigners to transfer technology to China in order to 
sell into the market . . . .”). 
102 China’s Protocol of Accession is the legal document that effects China’s entry into the WTO and 
that also creates binding WTO obligations on par with any of the WTO Agreements.  See infra Part 
III.B. 
103 See, e.g., Chris Isidore, U.S. vs. China: The Trade Battles, CNN MONEY (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:03 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/13/news/international/china-trade/index.htm (“And while U.S. 
businesses in a wide variety of industry sectors, from autos to technology to financial services, are 
unusually vocal in complaining about this set of Chinese rules, they haven’t been challenged at the 
WTO.  ‘To me, that’s actually the biggest issue, more even than currency valuation,’ said David Joy, 
chief market strategist for Ameriprise Financial.  ‘Being forced to give up technology for access to the 
market is essentially blackmail.’”).  See also ATKINSON, supra note 64, at 76 (asserting the necessity of 
a WTO resolution). 
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A.  The National Treatment Principle 
 
The WTO sets forth the legal framework for trade and economic 
relations among its member states in number 157, which, as of this writing, 
includes all of the world’s major trading powers.104  The WTO contains 
three major treaties which are mandatory and binding upon all members 
upon accession to the WTO: (1) the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), governing the trade in goods; (2) the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), governing the trade in services; and (3) the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
governing the trade in technology or intellectual property.105  Together, 
these three agreements, each administered by a WTO body dedicated to 
each agreement, govern three of the four major channels of international 
trade.106  For historical and political reasons, only foreign direct 
investment, the fourth major channel of trade, is not covered by a WTO 
agreement.107  A fourth major agreement, the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), is also a mandatory agreement which governs the 
resolution of disputes and creates an effective enforcement mechanism of 
WTO obligations.108 
One of the foundational principles of the WTO is the National 
Treatment Principle, first enshrined in the GATT in 1947109 but now also 
found in the GATS110 and TRIPS.111  GATT Article III provides in relevant 
part: 
 
Article III National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Treatment 
 
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other 
 
104 WTO Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
105 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 28. 
106 See id.  
107 See id. at 567, 570.  An attempt was made to draft a general agreement, the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI), but the MAI, drafted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development, based in Paris and comprised of advanced industrialized countries, failed to win 
support due to unprecedented opposition by developing countries, which believed that their interests 
were not represented.  After the failure of the MAI, the priorities of the WTO shifted to other areas of 
concern, such as agriculture and food security, environmental protection, and access to medicines.  
There appears to be little political will to resuscitate any attempts to create a general agreement on 
foreign investment.  For a fuller discussion, see id. at 570. 
108 See id. at 28. 
109 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
110 See General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. II, XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 
[hereinafter GATS]. 
111 See Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 3–4, April 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative 
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products 
in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to 





4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported 
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.112 
 
GATT Articles III:1 and III:4 set forth a principle of non-
discrimination against foreign imports, i.e., WTO members cannot impose 
laws or regulations that discriminate in the purchase or sale of foreign 
goods in favor of local goods, but must provide equal treatment to both 
types of goods.  The National Treatment Principle is a principle of non-
discrimination designed to prohibit countries from discriminating against 
imports in favor of domestic products.113  The National Treatment Principle 
does not depend on actual effects114: no discrimination in practice must be 
proven; National Treatment requires equality in competitive conditions for 
imports and local products.115 
GATT Article III:1 and III:4, however, are limited by an explicit 
exception contained in GATT Article III:8, which provides as follows: 
 
8(a). The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, 
regulations, or requirements governing the procurement by 
governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental 
purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view 
to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.116 
 
The combination of the provisions of GATT Article III set forth above 
shows that the National Treatment Principle is a broad principle of non-
discrimination.  The principle prohibits WTO members from discriminating 
 
112 GATT, supra note 109, art. III. 
113 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 142. 
114 See id. at 143. 
115 See GATT, supra note 109, art. III:8(a). 
116 Id. 
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against foreign goods in favor of domestic products, but it does not apply to 
government procurement.117  In the area of government procurement, 
Article III:8(a) creates an exception to National Treatment; Article III:8(a) 
makes clear that nothing in the GATT prevents WTO members from 
discriminating against imports in favor of domestic goods in government 
procurement.118  When the GATT was originally drafted in 1947, the 
drafters believed that it was important to exempt government procurement 
from the National Treatment Principle in recognition of the importance to 
many countries of buying goods from domestic suppliers in order to 
support their own economies.119  Due to the same policies and concerns, a 
similar provision in GATS also exempts government procurement of 
services from the National Treatment principle.120  Thus, under the GATT, 
which applies to trade in goods, and the GATS, which applies to trade in 
services, WTO members are free to discriminate against foreign goods and 
services in favor of domestic goods and services in government 
procurement.121 
After the original GATT came into effect in 1947, government 
procurement became an increasingly important part of international trade 
and an effort was made to adopt some standards to prevent discrimination 
in government procurement of foreign goods.122  An agreement on 
government procurement, requiring National Treatment as applied to goods 
 
117 Id. 
118 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173. 
119 See id. 




1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers 
of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service 
suppliers.  
 
See GATS art. XVII.  GATS Article XIII(1) states in relevant part: 
 
1. Article . . . XVII shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the 
procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased for governmental purposes 
and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the supply of services 
for commercial sale. 
 
2. There shall be multilateral negotiations on government procurement in services under 
this Agreement within two years from the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement. 
 
See also GATS art. XIII(1). 
121 See GATT, supra note 109, art. III; GATS, supra note 110, arts. II, XVII. 
122 See id. 
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only, was negotiated during the Tokyo Round and entered into force on 
January 1, 1981.123  The Tokyo Agreement, like all subsequent agreements 
on government procurement, was binding only on countries that chose to 
join the agreement.124  The Tokyo Agreement was narrow in scope and 
coverage125 and negotiations were conducted during the Uruguay Round, 
begun in 1986, to greatly expand it.126  At the end of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations, which led to the establishment of the WTO, the Government 
Procurement Agreement was adopted in 1994 and recently a new GPA was 
adopted in 2011 (2011 GPA).127  Article IV of the 2011 GPA provides: 
 
Article IV: Non-Discrimination 
 
1. With respect to any measure regarding covered procurement, 
each Party, including the procuring entities, shall accord 
immediately and unconditionally to the goods and services of any 
other Party and to the suppliers of any other Party offering the 
goods or services of any Party, treatment no less favourable than 
the treatment the Party, including its procuring entities, accords 
to: 
 
(a) domestic goods, services and suppliers; and 
 
(b) goods services and suppliers of any other Party.128 
 
123 Plurilaterals: Of Minority Interest, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm#govt (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
124 See id. 
125 The Tokyo Agreement applied only to national entities and to tendering procedures for the 
purchase of goods.  The present agreement achieves a tenfold expansion in coverage, which now 
includes sub-national government entities and trade in services.  See id. 
126 See id. 
127 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 174.  The 2011 
GPA expands the number of central and sub-central government entities as well as government owned 
enterprises that are covered by GPA commitments and adds over fifty new categories of services.  The 
2011 GPA was also designed to expedite accession of new members, such as China.  See id. at 173–74.  
128 See Comm. on Gov’t Procurement, Decision on the Outcomes of the Negotiations Under Article 
XXIV:7 of the Agreement on Government Procurement, Annex to the Protocol Amending the Agreement 
on Government Procurement, art. IV, WTO Doc. No. GPA/113 (Apr. 2, 2012).  The full text of the 
2011 GPA is contained in the Annex to the Protocol amending the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, which is attached to the March 2012 Decision.  Under paragraph 2 of the March 2012 
Decision, the Protocol Amending the 1994 Government Procurement Agreement—that is, the 2011 
GPA—will enter into force on the 30th day following deposits of acceptance of the Protocol by two 
thirds of the Parties to the 1994 GPA.  So far the EU, the United States, Hong Kong/China, the Separate 
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Canada, Norway, and Liechtenstein have 
deposited instruments of acceptance of the Protocol.  As there are 15 parties to the GPA, the 2011 GPA 
will come into effect when 3 more parties deposit their instruments of acceptance.  The deposits are 
considered a formality since all members of the GPA have already agreed to adopt the 2011 GPA, and 
the March 12 Decision “means that all elements of the re-negotiations have now been agreed and that 
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The result of Article IV:(1)(a) of the 2011 GPA is that it removes the 
exception for government procurement contained in GATT Article III:8(a) 
for members of the GPA because all GPA members must extend non-
discriminatory treatment in government procurement of goods and services 
from foreign vendors from other GPA countries.  In purchasing goods and 
services, governments of GPA members must provide to foreign goods and 
services from other GPA countries “treatment no less favourable than the 
treatment the Party . . . accords to . . . domestic goods, services, and 
suppliers.”129  This treatment has been interpreted to mean equality in the 
conditions of competition such as equality in the bidding conditions by 
domestic and foreign suppliers for government contracts and in the award 
of government contracts.130  No GPA member can discriminate in favor of 
its own domestic vendors of goods or services and against goods or 
services from other members of the GPA.131 
Note that members of the GPA are required to apply this obligation of 
non-discrimination only to goods and services from other GPA members.132  
Article IV:1(b) of the 2011 GPA requires that the GPA signatories 
(including the United States) “shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to the goods and services of any other Party . . . treatment 
no less favorable than the treatment the Party . . . accords to . . . goods, 
services and suppliers of any other Party.”133  “[O]ther Party” refers to 
other parties of the GPA, so all GPA members are entitled to receive 
treatment equivalent to that afforded to any “other party” of the GPA.134  In 
other words, the United States is required to extend non-discriminatory 
treatment in government procurement to other GPA members, but it is not 
required to provide non-discriminatory treatment in government 
procurement to China or any other member of the WTO that is not a 
member of the GPA.  The United States has implemented a set of federal 
laws that prohibit government procurement from any country that is not a 
member of the GPA.135  However, this prohibition applies only to the 
federal government or entities using federal funds.  States are free to use 
state funds to purchase goods and services from China.136  Some states, 
 
the revised Agreement can enter into force subject to the submission of instruments of acceptance by 
GPA Parties.”  Id. 
129 Id. art. IV:1(a)–(b). 
130 Id. art. IV (Non-Discrimination), art. VIII (Conditions for Participation), art. IX (Qualification 
of Suppliers); art. XIII (Limited Tendering); art. XV (Treatment of Tenders and Awarding of 
Contracts). 
131 Id. art. IV:1(a)–(b).  
132 Id. art. IV:1(b). 
133 Id. (emphasis added). 
134 See supra note 128. 
135 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–2518 (2006), §§ 301, 302, 308. 
136 See, e.g., Richard Gonzales, California Turns to China for New Bay Bridge, NPR (Sept. 16, 
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such as New York and California, have purchased billions of dollars of 
public works from China.137  This scheme suggests that China is able to 
benefit from government procurement from the United States at the state 
level, but that China discriminates at all levels, both central and local, 
against all U.S. vendors in its government procurement.  Some view this 
relationship as non-reciprocal and unfair to the United States.138 
While China’s discriminatory government procurement policies would 
violate the GPA if China were a member of the GPA, China is not a 
member and has no obligation to join the GPA.  Unlike the GATT, GATS, 
TRIPS, and the DSU, which are automatically binding on all WTO 
members upon accession to the WTO, the GPA is a “plurilateral” 
agreement, which means that it is voluntary.139  As of this writing, there are 
fifteen members of the GPA composed of forty-two WTO members (the 
EU has joined on behalf of its twenty-seven member states) and virtually 
all are developed countries.140  Since the WTO has 157 member states, the 
bulk of the WTO are not members of the GPA, and most of these states are 
developing countries.  It is important to note that even those states that are 
members of the GPA are allowed to exclude certain government entities 
from GPA obligations, and excluded government entities are free to 
discriminate in favor of domestic goods.141  As we shall see, the ability of 
GPA members to exclude government entities from the GPA is an 
important element in the current controversy between the United States and 
China.142 
While China is not currently a member of the GPA, China has been 
negotiating with GPA members, led by the United States and the European 
 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/16/140515737/california-turns-to-china-for-new-bay-bridge.  State 
actions like these do not mean, however, that the federal government has not attempted to emphasize its 
desire to curtail U.S. spending in China by states.  See China Fair Trade Act of 2012, S. 3449, 112th 
Congress (2d Sess. 2012). 
137 See Barboza, supra note 21, at A1. 
138 Pointing out the non-reciprocal relationship in government procurement between the United 
States and China, recent presidential candidate Mitt Romney vowed to discontinue all government 
procurement from China until China joined the GPA.  See Mitt Romney Wants Reciprocity with China 
When It Comes to Government Procurement, ALLIANCE FOR AM. MFG. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://americanmanufacturing.org/blog/mitt-romney-wants-reciprocity-china-when-it-comes-
government-procurement. 
139 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173.  No nation is 
required to join the GPA.  Nations that join do so when they believe that it is in their own economic 
interests.  For official WTO site and explanation, see Overview of the Government Procurement 
Agreement, supra note 29. 
140 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173. 
141 See id.  The new 2011 GPA is a major advancement because GPA members have committed to 
include many new government entities within the scope of GPA obligations.  
142 See infra note 212 and accompanying text.  The ability to exclude government entities from 
GPA commitments is consistent with the voluntary nature of the GPA.  WTO members can choose to 
join the GPA on terms and conditions as they determine.   
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Union, for accession to the GPA for several years.143  Yet, the prospects for 
China’s accession in the immediate future appear to be dim.144  Recently, 
the United States opposed China’s offer of accession to the GPA on the 
grounds that China’s offer excluded too many government entities from 
GPA obligations.145 
 
B.  Arguments That China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies Violate 
WTO Obligations 
 
Although China is not a member of the GPA and is not bound to 
extend National Treatment to foreign goods in government procurement, a 
number of critics have argued that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies 
violate other WTO obligations.146  These obligations can be divided into 
two groups: procedural and substantive obligations. 
 
1.  Violations of Procedural Obligations 
 
The WTO contains a number of provisions requiring transparency, a 
basic principle of the WTO contained in GATT X.  Article X:1 requires the 
prompt publication of laws, regulations, and administrative rulings that 
affect the sale and distribution of goods in a manner that will enable 
governments to become familiar with them.147  GATT Article X:2 further 
 
143 Since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, China has made four offers to join the GPA, but 
GPA members have rejected all of these offers.  An “offer” includes a schedule of which Chinese 
government entities will be bound by the GPA and the volume of trade that will be subject to the GPA.  
China has a history of making offers that are limited in scope and coverage.  If China’s offer is accepted 
by other GPA members, then China is entitled to the full benefits of the much more expansive 
schedules of the United States and the European Union.  The European Union was very critical of 
China’s latest offer.  See Terrill Yue Jones, Europe Says China’s Latest Bid to Join Procurement 
Agreement “Highly Disappointing,” REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/12/06/us-china-eu-trade-idUSBRE8B50G720121206. 
144 See China Announces Next Step in Joining Government Procurement Agreement, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. (July 18, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/gpro_18jul12_e.htm. 
145 See Paul Eckert, China Agreements to Currency, Procurement Reforms in Talks with U.S., 
REUTERS, July 12, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/12/us-usa-china-
economy-idUSBRE96B0MI20130712 (noting that China’s recent bid in 2012 did not pass muster with 
the United States).  
146 See, e.g., An & Peck, supra note 49. 
147 GATT Article X:1 provides in relevant part:  
 
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application 
made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation 
of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to 
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of 
payments therefor, of affecting their sale, distribution . . . shall be published promptly in 
such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. 
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requires that countries should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire 
information about such measures in order to protect and adjust their 
interests or to seek modification of such measures.148 
An additional set of transparency obligations are contained in China’s 
Protocol of Accession.149  The Working Party Report, leading up to China’s 
Protocol of Accession, states that China’s laws, regulations, and 
administrative rulings must be made available to the public.150  The 
Protocol of Accession states that with respect to laws, regulations, and 
other measures affecting the trade in goods, WTO members are to be 
allowed a “reasonable period for comment to the appropriate authorities 
before such measures are implemented.”151  The Working Party Report 
requires that China “make available to WTO Members translations into one 
or more of the official languages of the WTO all laws, regulations and 
other measures . . . affecting the trade in goods . . . in no case later than 90 
days after they were implemented or enforced.”152 
A related transparency argument is that China may also be in possible 
violation of GATT Article X:3(a) requiring the uniform, impartial, and 
reasonable administration of laws and regulations pertaining to the trade in 
goods.153  Part I.2(A) of China’s Protocol of Accession also contains a 
requirement that “China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner” laws and regulations pertaining to the trade in 
goods.154  A related transparency argument is that China may also be in 
possible violation of GATT Article X:3(a) requiring the uniform, impartial, 
and reasonable administration of laws and regulations pertaining to the 
trade in goods.155  Part I.2(A) of China’s Protocol of Accession also 
 
See GATT, supra note 109, art. X:1. 
148 GATT Article X:2 provides in relevant part: 
 
2. No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance 
in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established an uniform practice, or 
imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, 
or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been 
officially published. 
 
See id. art. X:2. 
149 See China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part I.4(C).  
150 See Working Party on the Accession of China, Working Party Report on the Accession of China, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001), ¶ 339, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ 
documents/apcity/unpan002144.pdf [hereinafter Working Party Report]. 
151 China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part 1, ¶ 2(C)(1)–(2). 
152 See Working Party Report, supra note 150, ¶ 334.  
153 GATT Article X:3(a) provides in relevant part: “Each contracting party shall administer in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner of its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind 
described in paragraph 1 of this Article.”  See GATT, supra note 109, art. X:3(a). 
154 See China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part 1, ¶ 2(A)(2). 
155 GATT Article X:3(a) provides in relevant part: “Each contracting party shall administer in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner of its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind 
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contains a requirement that “China shall apply and administer in a uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner” laws and regulations pertaining to the 
trade in goods.156  These two provisions require the administration of laws 
in a transparent manner and many argue that China applies its accreditation 
policies through internal processes that are not made publically available.157 
Critics contend that the publication of China’s policies related to the 
accreditation measures under the Indigenous Innovation Policies failed to 
satisfy these transparency obligations in a number of ways, including the 
failure to offer a period for comment and the failure by China to provide 
translations from Chinese into English or another one of the official 
languages of the WTO.158  Several foreign industries claim that China does 
not administer measures implementing China’s Indigenous Innovation 
Policies and its Protocol of Accession in an impartial or uniform manner 
but does so in a haphazard, unpredictable, and non-transparent fashion.159 
These merits of the arguments that China has violated its WTO 
transparency obligations depend on a number of technical distinctions and 
arguments that are too detailed to discuss in depth here, including whether 
China’s policies are the types of measures that are subject to transparency 
and uniform administration requirements.160  But these arguments are not to 
the point.  Assuming that China’s measures implementing its policies are 
subject to and constitute violations of the WTO provisions related to 
transparency and uniform administration, what are the consequences for 
China? 
In any dispute between WTO members, the ultimate goal of dispute 
settlement, whether through informal mediation or through the formal 
litigation process of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, is for an offending 
member to bring its non-complying measures into compliance with its 
WTO obligations.161  Alternatively, the parties may reach a mutually 
satisfactory solution.162  This basic approach is set forth in the DSU and is 
 
described in paragraph 1 of this Article.”  See GATT supra note 109, art. X:3(a). 
156 See China’s Protocol of Accession, supra note 35, Part 1, ¶ 2(A)(2). 
157 See Kathrin Hill, European Companies Attack Chinese Procurement Policy, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Eng.), Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/94e9b5c4-6af6-11e0-9744-00144feab49a.html# 
axzz2GRfv55VN (criticizing local governments and state owned enterprises for setting procurement 
policies in a non-transparent way). 
158 See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 413. 
159 See, e.g., Coalition of Services Industries, Industry Comments on the Draft Notice Launching the 
National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010, TIA (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.tiaonline.org/sites/default/files/pages/FINALMultiAssocNIIPComments05-07-2010English.pdf. 
160 For example, whether China has met the transparency requirements of GATT Article X:1 
depends on whether China’s measures fall within the scope of GATT Article X:1 relating to sale and 
distribution and whether the measures have met the timing requirement of GATT Article X:1 that the 
measures be published in a timely manner so as to allow governments and traders to become acquainted 
with them.  These are very technical issues.  See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 406–14. 
161 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 67. 
162 See id. 
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an accepted norm and expectation within the WTO system.163  As 
compliance or mutual agreement is the ultimate goal of the dispute 
settlement system, if China is in violation of these provisions, China would 
need to cure its deficiencies by meeting transparency requirements (such as 
by publishing translations) and by administering its Indigenous Innovation 
Policies in a uniform, impartial, and transparent manner.  In other words, 
the remedy for non-transparency is creating transparency. 
China’s transparent administration of its Indigenous Innovation 
Policies, of course, would create important benefits.  U.S. vendors would 
benefit from greater transparency in understanding the accreditation 
process and the workings of the central and sub-central entities involved in 
government procurement; the United States would also benefit from greater 
transparency in negotiating with China for future changes.164  While these 
benefits may accrue, China is not required, even assuming that these claims 
are proven in a WTO dispute settlement case, to change the substantial 
content of its policies.  Furthermore, China is most certainly not required to 
join the GPA.  In other words, the argument that China has violated its 
procedural obligations relating to transparency may result in China’s 
correction of those procedural irregularities, but it will not affect the 
substantial content of any of China’s current existing government 
procurement policies.  At this time, one has to wonder why such a 
challenge would be brought in a case, or even raised with China informally, 
as the result will not achieve what U.S. industries really desire: the 
withdrawal of the policies and China’s entry into the GPA.  To the 
contrary, if the United States were to bring a formal challenge against 
China for procedural violations, such a case could antagonize China and 
might only harden China’s stance.165 
 
2.  Violations of Substantive Obligations 
 
 
163 For example, Article 22.8 of the WTO DSU provides in relevant part: 
 
8. The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall be 
applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement 
has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings 
provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually 
satisfactory solution is reached. 
 
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter DSU].  
164 The author is indebted to Professor Timothy Webster for pointing out the benefits of 
transparency. 
165 No country, including the United States, likes being sued in the WTO and having to defend itself 
against an accusation that it is not living up to its WTO obligations.  Most countries are likely to view 
being sued as an unfriendly act. 
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Apart from possibilities of procedural violations, critics have made a 
number of arguments that China’s government procurement policies violate 
China’s substantive obligations under the WTO.166  Although a number of 
arguments have been raised,167 the discussion below focuses on arguments 
that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies violate commitments in TRIPS 
and in its Protocol of Accession. 
 
a.  TRIPS 
 
So far we have examined the National Treatment Principle contained 
in GATT Article III and the exceptions for government procurement.  As 
noted earlier, the National Treatment Principle is also contained in TRIPS, 
which governs trade in technology.  Do China’s Indigenous Innovation 
Policies, which relate to technology trade, violate the TRIPS National 
Treatment Principle?  Article 3 of TRIPS provides in relevant part: 
 
Each member shall accord to the nationals of other Members 
treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own nationals 
with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to 
exceptions [in existing IP treaties not relevant here].168 
 
The language of TRIPS Article 3 refers to “treatment . . . with regard 
to the protection” of intellectual property.169  TRIPS further explains that 
“‘protection’ shall include matters affecting the availability, acquisition, 
scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well 
as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifically 
addressed in this Agreement.”170 
As an example of a violation of TRIPS Article 3, the United States 
required Cuban nationals who owned certain registered U.S. trademarks to 
undertake an additional procedural step to protect their U.S. trademarks in 
U.S. courts, a step that U.S. nationals are not required to take to protect 
their trademarks.171  Cuban nationals, including state owned companies, 
 
166 See, e.g., An & Peck, supra note 49, at 423–42. 
167 See id. 
168 TRIPS, supra note 111, art. 3. 
169 Id. (emphasis added). 
170 See id. n.3. 
171 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations, ¶¶ 277–281, 
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (adopted Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations].  This case arose in the context of a French-Cuban joint venture that sought to enforce 
the trademark rights to “Havana Rum,” a trademark that had been confiscated from the Arechabala 
family in Cuba by the Cuban government.  The Cuban government then assigned the confiscated 
trademark to a Cuban state-owned company, which then registered the “Havana Rum” trademark in the 
United States and later formed a joint venture with a French company.  Bacardi, a U.S. company, had 
purchased any rights to the trademark from the Arechabalas, who had moved to Spain.  Bacardi and 
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who sought to enforce U.S. registrations of trademarks based upon the 
same or a similar Cuban trademark were required to demonstrate that they 
had the permission of the original trademark owner whose trademark had 
been confiscated by the Cuban government.172  Nationals of the United 
States and all other WTO countries were not required to prove consent of 
the owner of the original Cuban trademark.173  The purpose of this law was 
to prevent the Castro government from expropriating private businesses 
and their trademarks and then using the trademarks in U.S. commerce.174  
Under these facts, the WTO Appellate Body held that the applicable U.S. 
law violates the National Treatment Principle contained in TRIPS, since the 
law imposed more onerous conditions on Cuban nationals than on U.S. 
nationals.175  Or suppose that Country A imposed more restrictive 
administrative requirements and higher fees for the filing of patent 
applications by foreign nationals than for applications filed by its own 
nationals.  This type of requirement would also violate the National 
Principle contained in TRIPS.176  China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies, 
however, do not relate to the protection of IP rights.177  The policies 
contain a requirement that Chinese government entities purchase products 
with technology owned by Chinese legal enterprises.178  This is a policy 
that relates to the purchase of goods, which is within the scope of the 
GATT relating to goods,179 but falls outside of the scope of Article 3 of 
TRIPS, which relates to the protection of intellectual property.180 
 
b.  The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
 
Cuban interests in the United States lobbied the U.S. Congress to pass legislation that would block the 
French-Cuban venture from enforcing trademark rights to “Havana Rum.”  As a result, Congress passed 
Section 211, which required Cuban nationals asserting trademark rights in a trademark that had been 
confiscated from the original owners by the Cuban government to demonstrate that they had the 
approval of the original owner of the trademark.  U.S. nationals asserting trademark rights that had been 
confiscated from the original owners by the Cuban government did not have to demonstrate that they 
had acquired consent from the original trademark owners.  This discriminatory treatment—which 
imposed an additional procedural hurdle on Cuban nationals, but not on U.S. nationals—violated the 
National Treatment Principle. 
172 See id. ¶¶ 276–277. 
173 See id. 
174 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at XX. 
175 See Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations, supra note 171, ¶ 280. 
176 See CHOW & LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 257. 
177 See Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations, supra note 171, ¶ 243 (finding that the Article 3 
National Treatment Principle of TRIPS requires “WTO Members to accord no less favorable treatment 
to non-nationals than to nationals in the ‘protection’ of trade-related intellectual property rights”) 
(emphasis added).  
178 See supra notes 42–48. 
179 The procurement of goods by governmental agencies is explicitly excepted from the National 
Treatment Principle under GATT Article III:8(a).  See GATT, supra note 109, art. III.  
180 For a definition of “protection,” see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
supra note 10. 
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Some have argued that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies result 
in the granting of illegal subsidies and must be withdrawn.181  A subsidy is 
a financial contribution by a government182 that is specific to an enterprise, 
industry, or group of enterprises or industries.183  A subsidy distorts trade 
because the financial contribution provides a cost advantage that can be 
passed on by the recipient industry in the form of lower prices to 
consumers in the home country.184  If the enterprise or industry exports the 
goods, then the subsidy allows the exporter to charge a lower price in the 
export market, harming industries in the export market.185  If an illegal 
subsidy exists, an aggrieved WTO member state can directly challenge the 
subsidy with the WTO.186  If the WTO dispute settlement body finds that 
an illegal subsidy exists, the WTO will recommend that the nation 
providing the subsidy withdraw the measure without delay.187 
Certain types of subsidies are deemed prohibited or illegal per se.188  
In the case of prohibited subsides, as opposed to all other types of 
subsidies, the aggrieved state does not need to prove any harm caused;189 
the existence of the prohibited subsidy alone is sufficient to require its 
withdrawal.190  Among the category of prohibited subsidies are “subsidies 
contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods.”191  The argument is that China’s 
Indigenous Innovation Policies provide a prohibited subsidy to Chinese 
enterprises by requiring Chinese governmental entities to purchase 
domestic goods over imported goods.192 
 
181 I am indebted to Professors Juscelino Colares and Timothy Webster for pointing out this 
argument. 
182 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1(a)(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
183 See id. art. 2.1. 
184 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 494–95. 
185 See id. 
186 In a case where a domestic industry exports subsidized goods to the United States, the United 
States is also allowed to impose a “countervailing duty,” i.e., an additional tariff, equal to the amount of 
the subsidy to offset its effects.  This is a unilateral remedy.  If the recipient of the subsidy does not 
export any products, then the only remedy available is to bring an action with the WTO seeking the 
withdrawal of the measure.  See id. at 493. 
187 See SCM Agreement, supra note 182, art. 4.7. 
188 See id. art. 3. 
189 All other subsidies are actionable subsidies.  See id. Part III.  To be illegal, an actionable subsidy 
must result in “adverse effects to the interests of other Members.”  See id. art. 5. 
190 See id. arts. 3–4. 
191 Id. art. 3.1(b). 
192 The purchase of goods by the Chinese government is a payment to a Chinese enterprise and is 
“contingent” upon the purchase of the Chinese goods in place of a foreign made good.  This falls within 
the definition under SCM Article 3.1(b) of a subsidy that is contingent upon the purchase of a domestic 
good over imported goods. 
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Subsidies are a complex issue under the WTO and a full analysis of 
whether China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies constitute subsidies would 
require an extended study, which is beyond the scope of this Article.  It is 
also notoriously difficult to predict the outcome of complex litigation with 
the WTO.  For the sake of argument, assume that the United States is able 
to successfully litigate this issue and obtain a decision from the WTO 
requiring China to withdraw its Indigenous Innovation Policies as 
prohibited subsidies.  Note that nothing would prevent China from 
implementing a different set of policies, outside the scope of any WTO 
decision on its Indigenous Innovation Policies, which would achieve the 
same result.193  For example, China could provide direct grants to Chinese 
enterprises to spur research and development instead of buying products 
from Chinese enterprises in place of imports.194  China could also 
reformulate its policies so that they are outside the bounds of any WTO 
decision rejecting its Indigenous Innovation Policies.195  The United States 
would have to file a new case challenging China’s new policies and spend 
three to five years preparing and litigating the case to a successful outcome 
in the WTO.196  Meanwhile, China will reap the benefits of these new 
policies and can continue the cycle of litigation and issuance of new 
policies indefinitely.  Further, obtaining a withdrawal of China’s 
Indigenous Innovation Policies will not achieve the result most desired by 
the United States: China’s entry into the GPA.  It is difficult to see how 
requiring China to withdraw its policies will induce China to join the GPA, 
 
193 The fundamental purpose of dispute settlement in the WTO is to bring non-conforming 
measures enacted by a WTO member into compliance with the WTO.  This means that if the panel or 
the Appellate Body finds that a measure violates the WTO agreements, the panel or the Appellate Body 
will recommend that the offending nation withdraw the measure.  This is the extent of the role 
performed by WTO panels and the Appellate Body.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 64–67.  The WTO does not instruct its members on how to conduct their 
own internal affairs.  This would allow China or any other WTO member to adopt a different set of 
measures that violate the same WTO obligations, but in a different manner.  Chinese central authorities 
could also issue oral demands, which is a common practice in China.  Of course, such maneuvers would 
be viewed rather dimly by other WTO members, but are not illegal. 
194 Domestic subsidies, i.e., payments made by a government only to domestic industries but not to 
foreign industries, are permitted under the GATT.  GATT Article III:8(b) explicitly recognizes that the 
National Treatment obligation set forth in Article III “shall not prevent the payment of subsidies 
exclusively to domestic producers.”  This GATT exception allows a country to make a direct payment 
to a domestic industry without making a similar payment to a foreign industry.  See Italian 
Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Report of the GATT Panel, L/833-&S/60, 
adopted on Oct. 23, 1958, ¶ 14. 
195 See supra note 193.  
196 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 69–70 (setting 
forth a step-by-step schedule in U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline in which 
the timeline is three to five years, depending on whether the case is measured by date of adoption of 
contest legislation (five years) or date of commencement of the WTO dispute settlement process (two 
years, seven months)); Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
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as GPA membership is purely voluntary.  Such an action might have the 
opposite effect of hardening China’s stance (because no nation likes to lose 
in WTO litigation) and creating additional delays. 
 
c.  China’s Protocol of Accession 
 
The issue of China’s joining the GPA arose during the negotiations of 
China’s Protocol of Accession.  The relevant paragraph in the Working 
Party Report, which was incorporated into the Protocol of Accession, reads 
in relevant part: 
 
339. The representative of China stated that China intended to 
become a Party to the GPA and that until such time, all 
government entities at the central and sub-national level . . . 
would conduct their procurement in a transparent manner, and 
provide all foreign suppliers with equal opportunity to participate 
in that procurement pursuant to the principle of MFN treatment. 
 
341. The representative of China responded that China would 
become an observer to the GPA upon accession to the WTO 
Agreement and initiate negotiations for membership in the 
GPA . . . as soon as possible.197 
 
Critics have argued that this language stating that China intended to 
join the GPA creates a legitimate expectation on the part of other WTO 
members that China would not introduce additional discriminatory 
measures that further disadvantaged foreign suppliers in government 
procurement.198  In other words, China’s promise to join the GPA as soon 
as possible was an implicit promise by China that, until its entry into the 
GPA, it would maintain the status quo in government procurement rather 
than creating further disadvantages for foreign suppliers.199  A line of WTO 
decisions beginning with EEC - Oilseeds I200 and continuing with Japan-
Photographic Film201 has considered cases in which a member is denied a 
 
197 Working Party Report, supra note 150, ¶¶ 339–341. 
198 See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 423–33. 
199 Id. at 427–28 (noting that “[o]ther members may derive a legitimate expectation from the 
accession Protocol and the Working Party Report that China would not introduce additional 
discriminatory measures affecting China’s government procurement market prior to its accession to the 
GPA”). 
200 Report of the Panel, European Economic Community—Payments and Subsidies Paid to 
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627 (Jan. 25, 1990), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991) [hereinafter EEC - Oilseeds I]. 
201 Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, ¶ 10.61, 
WT/DS44/R (Apr. 22, 1998) (Report of the Panel adopted on April 22, 1998) [hereinafter Japan—
Photographic Film]. 
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legitimate benefit derived from a justified expectation based upon an 
understanding or agreement with another WTO member.202  If an 
understanding or agreement was reached during negotiations involving a 
trade concession between WTO members, the later withdrawal of the 
understanding by the party making the promise might create harm to the 
aggrieved party that is actionable under the WTO. 
The legal standard under the WTO for bringing a cause of action is 
where a legitimate benefit is “nullified or impaired”203 by a measure of the 
offending nation.  Such an action can give rise to a claim under GATT 
Article XXIII:1(b), the original dispute settlement provision in the GATT, 
although GATT Article XXIII has been supplemented by the DSU.204  The 
argument is that China’s stated intentions of joining the GPA created a 
legitimate expectation on the part of other WTO members that until its 
entry into the GPA, China would not act in a way that is inconsistent with 
the GPA or at least would not introduce additional discriminatory measures 
 
202 EEC - Oilseeds I, supra note 200, ¶ 147. 
203 GATT Article XXIII reproduced in full in the following note. 
204 GATT Article XXIII Nullification and Impairment provides: 
 
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of 
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of  
 
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this 
Agreement, or 
 
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or 
 
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the 
satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the 
other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.  Any contracting 
party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the recommendations or 
proposals made to it. 
 
GATT, supra note 109, art. XXIII.  Article XXIII was the original provision providing for dispute 
settlement.  It has since been supplemented by the DSU, which set up a more elaborate dispute 
settlement system.  GATT Article XXIII has been incorporated into the DSU by DSU Article 3 so the 
“nullification and impairment” standard is still the current legal standard under the DSU.  The claim 
that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies cause a nullification and impairment of a trade benefit 
created by China’s Protocol of Accession is an example of a so-called “non-violation” case under 
Article XXIII:1(b).  A “violation” case under Article XXIII:1(a) involves the breach of a provision in a 
WTO agreement.  By contrast, a “non-violation” case does not violate the language of any provision of 
a WTO agreement but otherwise undermines a benefit.  In the case of China’s Indigenous Innovation 
Policies, it is not possible to point to the language of a covered WTO agreement and show that China is 
acting in violation of the provision.  Rather, China has created certain legitimate expectations by the 
language in its Protocol of Accession and is now defeating those expectations by the unexpected 
issuance and implementation of the Indigenous Innovation Policies.  No case has ever arisen under 
Article XXIII:1(c) referring to the “existence of any other situation.” 
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in government procurement prior to China’s entry into the GPA.205  This 
agreement by China formed part of the conditions under which WTO 
members agreed to allow China to accede to the WTO.  China’s failure to 
fulfil the legitimate expectations of other WTO members by enacting its 
Indigenous Innovation Policies is a violation of a WTO obligation for 
which a remedy is appropriate. 
The complaining party bears the burden of proof to establish a 
legitimate expectation of a benefit that has been nullified or impaired.206  
The language of the Working Party Report itself states that until it joins the 
GPA, China will provide foreign suppliers with “equal opportunity . . . 
pursuant to the principle of MFN treatment.”  MFN stands for “Most 
Favored Nation” treatment, one of the two fundamental principles of the 
GATT, along with National Treatment Principle, which were enshrined in 
the original GATT 1947.207  MFN is a principle of equality, i.e., China will 
treat all foreign suppliers equally and will not favor any single foreign 
supplier or disadvantage any single foreign supplier;208 all foreign suppliers 
from all countries will be given identical treatment.  MFN should be 
distinguished from National Treatment, which is also a principle of equality 
that states that all foreign and domestic suppliers shall receive equal 
treatment.209  It is perfectly possible to comply with MFN treatment and 
still violate National Treatment.  For example, suppose that China has a 
rule that only domestic suppliers can receive accreditation for government 
procurement purposes and that no foreign suppliers can receive 
accreditation.  This rule would violate National Treatment (assuming that 
China was required to apply this principle) because the rule discriminates 
in favor of domestic suppliers and against foreign suppliers.  However, this 
rule does not violate MFN so long as all foreign suppliers receive equal 
treatment, i.e., all are denied accreditation.  If China accredited some 
foreign suppliers but refused to accredit others under the same conditions 
then a possible MFN violation might have occurred. 
It is also possible to violate National Treatment Principle without 
violating MFN.  Suppose that China prohibits discrimination in favor of 
domestic goods and against foreign goods; but as among foreign goods, 
certain goods receive preferences while others do not.  This policy would 
satisfy National Treatment Principle as domestic and foreign goods are 
treated equally but would violate MFN because certain foreign goods 
 
205 See An & Peck, supra note 49, at 427–28. 
206 See Japan—Photographic Film, supra note 201, ¶ 10.32. 
207 See supra note 109. 
208 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 130.  
209 The Most Favored National Principle requires that all foreign vendors from other WTO 
members be given equal treatment.  The National Treatment Principle requires that all foreign imports 
be given treatment no less favorable than that given to domestic products.  Thus, the Most Favored 
Nation Treatment Principle is a principle of external non-discrimination whereas the National 
Treatment Principle is a principle of internal non-discrimination.  See id. at 129.  
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receive better treatment than other foreign goods.  In other words, while 
both MFN and National Treatment Principle are principles of 
discrimination, they have different targets.  MFN is a principle of external 
non-discrimination while National Treatment Principle is a principle of 
international non-discrimination.210  It is possible to violate one without 
violating the other.  China’s statement that it intended to treat all foreign 
suppliers equally under the MFN cannot be read to imply that China also 
agreed to extend National Treatment to foreign suppliers.  In fact, the 
explicit reference to MFN accompanied with the omission of any reference 
to National Treatment seems to support the opposite inference that China 
was making no promises to accord National Treatment to foreign suppliers. 
Another hurdle in establishing legitimate expectations by other WTO 
members that China’s stated intention to join the WTO was an indication 
that China would not institute additional discriminatory measures in 
government procurement is created by the GPA itself.211  As noted earlier, 
the GPA allows its members to declare exceptions, i.e., to exclude 
designated government entities from the National Treatment of the GPA.212  
These excluded entities are then free to discriminate in favor of local 
products.  If China is free to condition its accession to the GPA on 
exceptions, it becomes more difficult to argue that China’s Protocol of 
Accession created a promise that no additional conditions of discrimination 
would be added prior to China’s accession to the GPA.  Exclusions are 
actually permitted by the GPA itself for developing countries.213 
If the United States were to bring a case within the WTO alleging 
China’s violation of its substantive obligations, the burden would be on the 
United States to demonstrate that language in the Working Party Report 
referring to MFN treatment in government procurement creates a legitimate 
expectation of National Treatment or no additional discriminatory 
measures inconsistent with National Treatment in government 
procurement.214  The discussion above indicates that this might be a 
difficult burden to meet.  Even assuming that the United States can meet 
this burden and show nullification and impairment, what relief would be 
available to the United States?  DSU Article 26.1 states that “where a 
 
210 See id. 
211 Each GPA member submits a schedule of covered government entities and goods and services 
subject to the GPA.  Any government entity or goods or services not on the schedule are not subject to 
the obligations of the GPA.  See Overview of the Government Procurement Agreement, supra note 29.  
212 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 173.  The United 
States objected to China’s offer to join the GPA in 2010 because China’s offer excluded too many 
government entities.  See Loretta Chao, China Reapplies to WTO Procurement Group, WALL ST. J., 
July 21, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704723604575378833136966648 
(noting that China’s proposal falls far short of their requirements on several accounts since state owned 
enterprises and provincial or local governments are excluded from the GPA by the proposal). 
213 See Overview of the Government Procurement Agreement, supra note 29. 
214 See Japan—Photographic Film, supra note 201, ¶ 10.32. 
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measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits . . . there is no 
obligation to withdraw the measure.  The panel or Appellate Body shall 
recommend the Member concerned make a mutually satisfactory 
adjustment.”215  The most important part of this provision is that even if 
China’s measures related to its Indigenous Innovation Policies were found 
to violate its obligations under the Protocol of Accession, China is not 
required to repeal or withdraw them.  China is to make a “mutually 
satisfactory adjustment.”216  An adjustment that is mutually satisfactory 
must be satisfactory to China; it is unclear how long this process is to take, 
but achieving a result that is mutually satisfactory could result in long 
delays or an indefinite stalemate.217  Moreover, it is difficult to see how 
such a result would persuade China to withdraw its policies or expedite 
China’s accession into the GPA. 
 
C.  China’s Incentive to Join the GPA 
 
Before we examine how the controversy might be resolved going 
forward, this part discusses why China might have little incentive to join 
the GPA.  Under current U.S. law, the U.S. federal government is 
prohibited from procuring goods and services from non-GPA members, 
including China.218  The states, however, can and do purchase goods and 
services from China.219  If China joins the GPA, the U.S. federal 
government will be required to open up its government procurement to 
China and provide Chinese vendors with non-discriminatory treatment. 
China may perceive, however, that it does not really stand to benefit in 
its trading relationship with the United States even if China joins the GPA.  
 
215 DSU, supra note 163, art. 26.1 (emphasis added). 
216 Id. 
217 China’s pattern of behavior indicates that China is not enthusiastic about joining the GPA.  
China has made four offers, each rejected by the United States and the European Union.  See Terril Yue 
Jones, Europe Says China’s Latest Bid to Join Procurement Agreement “Highly Disappointing,” 
REUTERS, Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/06/us-china-eu-trade-idUSBRE8B50 
G720121206.  The reasons for China’s lack of enthusiasm are discussed in Part III.C infra. 
218 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–18 (2006), §§ 301, 302, 308. 
219 See supra note 21; see also Richard Gonzales, California Turns to China for New Bay Bridge, 
NPR (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/16/140515737/california-turns-to-china-for-new-
bay-bridge; John W. Miller & Chuin-Wei Yap, U.S. Icons Now Made of Chinese Steel, WALL ST. J. 
(June 20, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324049504578545431938331880 
(“The Verrazano-Narrows Bridge was a feat of American engineering when it was built across New 
York’s harbor in the 1960s.  Now, it’s being repaired with steel made in China.”); Keith Schneider, 
Infusing from China for Toledo, Ohio, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/realestate/commercial/riverfront-in-toledo-ohio-gets-infusion-
from-china.html?_r=1& (“There were a few letters and a few blogs that took issue with our selling 
riverfront property to the Chinese or any foreign investor,” said Thomas S. Crothers, the deputy mayor 
for external relations.  “Our job, though, is to bring investment from domestic or foreign sources to 
revitalize our community.”). 
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China may believe that the U.S. government does not really intend to 
purchase from China, and China already has access to government 
procurement from the states.220  The U.S. government would be under 
political pressure to forgo the purchase of goods and services from China 
for several reasons.  In 2011, the United States had a $301.5 billion trade 
deficit with China.221  A trading nation (the United States) has a trade 
deficit with a trading partner (China) when the trading nation buys more in 
goods than it sells to its trading partner.222  A nation with a trade deficit 
buys more than it earns from the trade in goods and is living beyond its 
means, so its wealth will begin to shrink unless it can create economic 
growth by other means such as by innovation in technology, by attracting 
inward foreign direct investment, or by borrowing money.223  With its 
revenues earned through sales to the United States, China is buying up U.S. 
assets in the form of government securities, such as Treasury bonds, which 
means that China owns more and more of the U.S. economy.224  The 
negative consequences of a long term and expanding trade deficit with 
China have drawn harsh criticism in Congress.225 
Consequently, the U.S. government would likely come under severe 
political pressure to forgo buying goods from China instead of adding to 
the trade deficit.  Even if China joins the GPA, the U.S. government might 
find other means to prevent government procurement from China.  For 
example, under GATT Article XXI, a nation can refuse to follow a WTO 
obligation if such action is “necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests [in an] emergency in international relations.”226  Recently, 
the U.S. Congress issued a report declaring that two Chinese 
telecommunications companies posed a threat to national security and 
urged U.S. companies to find other vendors.227  The Chinese government 
might view this action and the current political climate in the United States 
as indications that even if China joins the GPA, the U.S. government is not 
 
220 China may believe that even if it joins the GPA, the U.S. federal government will come under 
intense political pressure to forgo buying goods and services from it due to the current hostile attitude 
towards China in the U.S. Congress. 
221 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 44. 
222 See id. at 30.  The 2011 figure quoted in the text above only refers to the trade in goods. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. at 44–48. 
225 See Bucking Trend: U.S. Trade Gap Grows, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577516673966206002.html (quoting an 
official from Congress’ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stating that China 
engages in “predatory, protectionist, and unfair trade practices”). 
226 See GATT, supra note 109, art. XXI (Security Exceptions). 
227 See U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong., 
Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Interests Posed by Chinese Telecommunications 
Companies Huawei and ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/ 
huawei.pdf. 
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likely to award large contracts to Chinese vendors.228  This means that 
China might perceive that it has little to gain from joining the GPA; the 
U.S. government will find reasons to limit its purchase of goods and 
services from China, and the states already buy from China.  While China 
has little to gain from joining the GPA, once China becomes a member, 
China will be required to dismantle its Indigenous Innovation Policies, 
which are crucial to attain China’s long term goals.  In other words, China 
may believe that the costs of joining the GPA far outweigh the benefits, if 
any, of becoming a GPA member. 
 
D.  Resolving the Controversy Going Forward 
 
The discussion and analysis of China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies 
that relate to government procurement makes clear several points that 
should guide U.S. companies and the U.S. government going forward.  
First, it is clear that few, if any, U.S. companies will be willing to meet the 
conditions necessary to qualify their products for accreditation by Chinese 
authorities for government procurement.  Few, if any, U.S. companies are 
likely to assign or sell their technology to an unaffiliated Chinese legal 
enterprise.  It is also unlikely that a U.S. company will undertake the time-
consuming and expensive process of setting up a Foreign-Invested 
Enterprise to serve as the recipient of its technology.  In light of these 
realities, the claim by some U.S. companies that they are being “forced” to 
transfer their technology to China where it will be “stolen”229 seems flatly 
disingenuous.  No one is forcing U.S. companies to look for opportunities 
in China’s government procurement market.  Instead, many U.S. 
companies do not see the options involving technology transfer described 
above to qualify for accreditation as practicable or desirable.  As a result, 
U.S. companies will either attempt to qualify for accreditation despite the 
risks or seek business opportunities elsewhere.  This is a business decision 
that U.S. companies will make after an assessment of the risks and rewards, 
a process that U.S. companies undergo every day.  If U.S. companies 
decide to apply for accreditation, then they have decided to accept China’s 
requirement that they transfer their technology to China.  This is ultimately 
a voluntary decision to accept business risks in pursuit of profits.  Since 
U.S. companies do not want to accept the risks associated with transferring 
their technologies to China and also do not want to lose the opportunity to 
sell to the Chinese government, U.S. companies, with the assistance of the 
 
228 This observation is based upon the author’s own discussions with academics and lawyers in 
China.  Of course, the Chinese government would never express such sentiments in print.  
229 See Hearing: China’s Five-Year Plan, Indigenous Innovation and Technology Transfers and 
Outsourcing Before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2011) (testimony of Adam 
Segal, Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/6.15.11Segal.pdf. 
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U.S. government, are actively engaged in lobbying and pressuring China to 
withdraw these policies and join the GPA.230 
The legal arguments that China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies 
violate other procedural or substantive obligations under the WTO have 
serious shortcomings, both on a doctrinal level and as a matter of political 
strategy.  Even if the United States were able to successfully litigate these 
points in the WTO and force China to withdraw its current government 
procurement policies, it still would not solve the crux of the problem facing 
U.S. companies.  What U.S. companies want is an equal opportunity to 
compete for government purchases of goods and services under conditions 
that do not favor Chinese goods and services.  Even if China withdrew its 
current policies, nothing prevents China from issuing other discriminatory 
rules against foreign goods and services in government procurement.231  
The only effective way to achieve the goal of equal access is to induce 
China to join the GPA under meaningful conditions that make this possible, 
i.e., without the use of broad exclusions of government entities that will 
significantly weaken the impact of the GPA.232 
In light of the complaints by the United States, China has made some 
changes to its policies.  In 2011, China announced that central level 
authorities would no longer engage in accreditation of products for 
government procurement.233  However, since 95% of all government 
procurement in China occurs at the sub-central level, i.e., at the provincial 
levels or lower,234 this change in policy is likely to have minimal effect on 
China’s government procurement.235  Moreover, while central-level 
authorities will no longer accredit products, it remains unclear whether the 
central-level authorities will ultimately purchase goods and services from 
U.S. vendors.  China often makes changes in response to external pressure 
 
230 See Hearing on President Obama’s Trade Policy Agenda with U.S. Trade Representative Ron 
Kirk, Second Panel on the Future of U.S. Trade Negotiations: Hearing before the Committee on Ways 
and Means, 112th Cong. 112-22 (2012) (statement of Congressman Earl Blumenauer), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=318517. 
231 While most WTO members would have dim views of such a sharp maneuver, it is legal under 
the WTO.  For example, in Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8.AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), the Appellate Body made clear that panel reports “are not binding, 
except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between parties to that dispute.” See Japan—
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra, at 14.  In the view of the author, this would allow China to enact 
a different set of laws that discriminate against goods and services from the United States because these 
measures would trigger a new and different dispute. 
232 Joining the GPA creates a positive obligation on the part of China to give non-discriminatory 
treatment to U.S. goods and services in government procurement.  See WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement, supra note 28, art. III. 
233 See 2013 WHITE PAPER, supra note 46, at 42.  
234 Government Procurement Administrative Measures (P.R.C.) (2011), available at 
http://www.ccgp.gov.cn. 
235 The central government does not actually purchase large amounts of goods and services.  The 
provinces and municipalities account for 95% of government procurement.  See id. 
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that may appear to offer real concessions, but they are, in the end, cosmetic 
changes that have little impact on the underlying problem.236  These modest 
changes are not likely to have a significant effect on the implementation of 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and have not stemmed the flow of 
criticism from U.S. politicians and U.S. companies about China’s 
policies.237 
In hindsight, it is now clear that an opportunity existed but was missed 
during the negotiations for China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO.238  
The United States, which assumed a leading role in the negotiations, made 
a strategic error in obtaining a promise by China that it intended to join the 
GPA instead of obtaining a binding commitment by China to join the GPA 
by a certain deadline and under certain conditions.239  The United States 
could also have negotiated China’s entry into the GPA simultaneously with 
China’s accession to the WTO under the Protocol of Accession.  Under this 
scenario, China would have been bound by the mandatory disciplines of the 
GATT, GATS, and TRIPS upon accession to the WTO and the GPA.  Of 
course, in retrospect, it is easy to point out this oversight.  When China was 
negotiating its entry into the WTO, China’s annual government 
procurement budget was a fraction of what it is today.  In the 1990s, it 
would have been hard to foresee that China’s government procurement 
budget would, by China’s own admission, grow ten-fold between 2002 to 
2012 from $16 billion to $178 billion.240  Moreover, according to the 
United States and the EU, China’s own estimates of its current government 
procurement budget significantly understate the full amount of resources 
that are currently available.241 
The United States and other WTO countries had leverage during the 
negotiations of the conditions of China’s accession to the WTO because 
China wanted to accede to the WTO as expeditiously as possible,242 but this 
 
236 If sub-central entities engage in 95% of all government procurement, a change in policy 
affecting the central government, which engages in only 5% of government procurement is, in actuality, 
a very minor concession.  
237 The China Fair Trade Act, which was not enacted in 2011, has been reintroduced in Congress in 
2012.  The China Fair Trade Act prevents the use of federal funds to purchase Chinese goods and 
services until China joins the Government Procurement Agreement.  See China Fair Trade Act of 2012, 
supra note 136. 
238 The United States likely did not anticipate that China’s government procurement would grow 
ten-fold in the span of one decade.  See supra note 16. 
239 In the negotiations leading up to China’s accession to the WTO, China stated that it “intended” 
to join the GPA and that it would become an observer to the GPA and initiate negotiations to join the 
GPA as soon as possible.  See Working Party Report, supra note 150, ¶¶ 339, 341.  This is a “soft” 
commitment and is not a legally binding. 
240 See supra note 16. 
241 See supra note 14. 
242 China had a strong interest in joining the WTO because without WTO membership, China 
endured a humiliating annual lecture and review of its human rights record by the U.S. Congress in 
order to obtain the much lower Most Favored Nation tariffs from the United States.  See Daniel C.K. 
CHOW_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:24 PM 
 Indigenous Innovation Policies and the WTO 
 34:81 (2013) 
121 
 
leverage no longer exists.  Indeed, the opposite may be true because the 
negotiating leverage has now shifted in China’s favor.  China may see little 
benefit in joining the GPA, at least in its trading relationship with the 
United States.243  This means that China has little incentive to join the GPA 
or to join the GPA without significant exclusions of its government entities 
from the GPA’s obligations.  What may be necessary are trade concessions 
in other areas, such as intellectual property, tariffs, and the use of 
antidumping and countervailing duties,244 from the United States to induce 
China to join the GPA on meaningful terms.  In other words, instead of 
using a “stick,” which seems to antagonize China, the United States and 
other GPA members might consider using a “carrot.”  One example of a 
trade concession would be to enter in to a free trade agreement with China 
under which some goods from members of the free trade agreement could 
be traded with very low tariffs or duty free—with tariffs of zero.245  Other 
examples of “carrots” might include commitments by the United States to 
forgo the extremely aggressive use of trade remedies currently in place and 
targeted at China,246 and to scale back on the aggressive use of U.S. trade 
 
Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade Organization, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L LAW 
(forthcoming 2013). 
243 See supra Part III.C. 
244 For a discussion of the controversy between the United States and China over dumping and 
countervailing duties, see Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Coming Trade Wars with the United States, 81 
UMKC L. REV. 257 (2012). 
245 A free trade agreement (FTA) imposes zero tariffs on all goods (or a selected list of goods) 
traded between the members of the FTA.  FTAs are expressly allowed by the WTO.  See GATT, supra 
note 109, art. XXIV.  Perhaps the most famous example of a free trade area is the European Union.  The 
United States has been particularly active in pursuing FTAs, both for trade and political purposes, i.e., 
the United States rewards friendly countries with FTAs.  In recent years, the United States has 
concluded bilateral FTAs with Australia, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Oman, Panama, the 
South African Customs Union, Singapore, and South Korea.  Several FTAs are now being negotiated, 
including a Japan–U.S. FTA as well as an EU–U.S. FTA.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 56.  China has also begun to pursue FTAs with 
countries around the world.  As of 2011, China has entered into FTAs with Chile, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Singapore, and the Association of South East Asian Nations.  See Jun Zhao & Timothy 
Webster, Taking Stock: China’s First Decade of Free Trade, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 65, 68 (2011).  
China’s pursuit of FTAs indicates a new stage in China’s use of international law and international 
institutions to cultivate economic relationships.  See id.  
246 The United States maintains that it is possible, despite a ruling from the WTO, to impose 
antidumping duties and countervailing duties on the same imports from China.  An antidumping duty is 
an extra tariff imposed on a product that is “dumped” in the United States.  See Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art.9, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement].  Dumping occurs if the product is 
sold at a lower price in the U.S. market than in China.  See id. art. 2.  Suppose, for example, that a good 
is sold for $100 in China and for $75 in the United States.  In this case, dumping may exist.  To offset 
the margin of dumping, the United States can impose an additional tariff, called an antidumping duty, of 
$25.  See id. art. 9.1; see also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 
443.  A countervailing duty is an extra tariff imposed when a foreign government provides a payment to 
a manufacturer contingent on export.  See SCM Agreement, supra note 182, arts. 1, 3.  Suppose, for 
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laws to influence the internal political affairs of other countries.247 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
China has a long-term goal of becoming an innovator of technology, 
not a recipient of technology created by the United States and other 
developed nations.  China believes that it can never enter the top ranks of 
the most competitive nations in the world unless it can develop its own 
capacity to create world-class technology and intellectual property.  A key 
component of this strategy is a government procurement policy that favors 
the government purchase of products and services containing technology 
developed in China or owned by Chinese legal enterprises.  This policy is 
designed to spur innovation in China and to develop a capacity for future 
innovation by Chinese industries, private inventors, and government 
institutes.  These policies have also caused a storm of controversy in the 
United States, which claims that these measures are unfair and illegal under 
the WTO. 
An analysis of this controversy, however, has demonstrated that China 
is likely within its legal rights in discriminating against foreign products 
and services in government procurement under an exception to National 
Treatment for government procurement.  While some critics have argued 
 
example, that the Chinese government pays a manufacturer of solar panels $100 per panel exported to 
the United States.  In this case, the United States can impose a countervailing duty of $25 to offset the 
subsidy.  See id. arts. 19.1–19.2.  Recently, the United States began imposing anti-dumping duties and 
countervailing duties on the same imports from China.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW, supra note 10, at 496.  Subsequently, China challenged this practice in the WTO.  In 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011), the Appellate Body ruled that assessing both 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same imports from China without assessing whether such 
duties would constitute double remedies violated Article 19.3 of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties Agreement.  In response, on March 13 2012, President Obama signed into law “An Act to Apply 
the Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 to Non-Market Economies, and for Other 
Purposes,” Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265.  The 2012 Act states that when the United States applies 
anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties to the same imports from China, if the United States can 
detect any double counting, the United States should reduce the duties to the extent of the double 
counting.  See Request for Consultation by China, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds-448-1(cr).pdf.  In other words, the United States still intends to 
impose both anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports from China and will reduce the duties 
to the extent of double counting if it can “detect” any double counting.  This example is meant to 
illustrate the extremely aggressive and hostile stance that the United States currently adopts towards 
trade with China, which creates tension between the two countries.  Some indication from the United 
States that it intends to relax its aggressive stance might be viewed as a friendly gesture by China and 
lead to a more positive attitude in joining the GPA.  
247 See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote its View of Human 
Rights, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (describing how China feels threatened by 
the United States’ aggressive use of trade to influence political reform in countries around the world 
and China’s own efforts to create a competing approach). 
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that China’s policies are in violation of other WTO obligations, the 
problem with this approach is that even if China is in violation of other 
WTO obligations, pressing those violations against China in the WTO 
would not reach the result that is most desired by U.S. businesses and the 
U.S. government.  This preferred end result is China’s entry into the GPA 
on meaningful terms, without broad exclusions that would significantly 
weaken the scope of application of the GPA to China’s government 
procurement.  Joining the GPA is a voluntary decision and there is no way 
to legally compel China to join the GPA.  At this point, however, the 
balance of power in negotiating leverage has shifted from the United States 
and other WTO powers to China, which may have little incentive to join 
the GPA.  Since joining the GPA is an entirely voluntary decision, the 
United States and other WTO countries might need to offer trade 
concessions to induce China to the GPA. 
For the long term, several larger lessons may be gleaned from this 
controversy.  Some have criticized China in the recent past for its failure to 
respect intellectual property rights.248  Some have argued that China’s 
shortcomings reflect a lack of understanding of the importance of 
intellectual property in modern economic development.249  China’s 
Indigenous Innovation Policies should dispel this misconception once and 
for all.  China completely understands the importance of advanced 
technology and intellectual property as well as the importance of being an 
innovator country.  In the author’s view, the issue has never been China’s 
lack of understanding of the importance of intellectual property; rather, the 
issue for China has always been how to get access to cutting-edge 
advanced technology without having to pay exorbitant fees or to be subject 
to onerous restrictions.  One lesson from this controversy is that China now 
wants to create powerful economic incentives to develop its own capacity 
to innovate.  This Article focuses on China’s Indigenous Innovation 
policies as they relate to government procurement, but China is attempting 
to create capacity through many different initiatives, including attracting 
top-flight scientists and foreign faculty to Chinese universities.250  
Achieving indigenous capacity to innovate is such a top national priority 
that it appears unlikely any amount of pressure from U.S. companies will 
deter China in reaching this goal. 
A second lesson is that China has made significant progress in 
 
248 See KERRY DUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40457, CHINA–U.S. RELATIONS: CURRENT 
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 
R40457.pdf. 
249 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173–220 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007), available at 
http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/ip/docs/ipResearch-op1.pdf. 
250 See Liz Gooch, Chinese Universities Send Big Signals to Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/asia/12iht-educlede12.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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learning how to use the rules of the multilateral trading system effectively 
and has come a long way since it negotiated its Protocol of Accession.  The 
Protocol of Accession contains a number of provisions that place China at a 
disadvantage, including a number of “WTO plus” obligations251 that 
require China to exceed requirements of the WTO.  The controversy over 
China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies indicates, however, that China now 
has the advantage in this set of negotiations.  As China’s economic power 
continues to grow, the United States and other members of the multilateral 
trading system can also expect China’s expertise and sophistication in 
matters of WTO law and its use of aggressive but effective negotiating 
strategies in international trade to grow accordingly. 
Finally, China’s own current pattern of action indicates that China 
intends to pursue highly aggressive policies in international trade, within 
the WTO, and on a bilateral basis with the United States.  China’s conduct 
indicates that the United States and other WTO members should not expect 
China to be willing to compromise its own economic interests, even 
slightly, in order to support broader systemic interests or changes that 
might benefit the multilateral trading system as a whole, but not China 
directly.  To the contrary, China believes that it is within its rights to use 
the rules of the multilateral trading system to its full advantage and to the 
outer limits of the law, with the overriding goal of aggressively promoting 
its own economic interests in order to increase its global power, influence, 
and stature in the modern world. 
 
251 See Julia Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An 
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003). 
